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CHAPTER 1
Search Advertising Effects on Competitors:
An Experiment Before a Merger
1.1 Introduction
Elance and oDesk are the two largest online work marketplaces. They connect employers and
freelancer workers and provide software tools to facilitate them working together online. On April
1, 2014, they merged. Prior to merging, these companies were fierce business competitors, and
battling search advertisers, often targeting their ads at the same search terms on Google and other
search engines. Figure 1.1 shows an example screenshot of a search engine results page for a search
term where both Elance and oDesk ads appear. Before the merger, we conducted an experiment
where we shut down Elance’s search advertising in half of the United States, randomized at the
regional level.1 Following the conclusion of the experiment and the consummation of the merger,
we gained access to oDesk’s advertising data and internal databases to assess the impact of the
Elance experiment on oDesk. Access to data from two search advertising and business competitors
is unique to our setting and central to our analysis.
We examine two sets of experimental effects: (1) the effects on oDesk’s search advertising
campaign and business, which we assess by exploiting the special opportunity resulting from the
merger, with a particular focus on the competition between the two companies over search ads
on their trademarked search keywords, and (2) the efficacy of Elance’s ads as measured by the
1Joseph Golden was an employee of Elance prior to the merger and designed the experiment.
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effects on its own business (which we compare to a naive observational estimate). The difficulty
of estimating these effects observationally motivated conducting an experiment. The most surpris-
ing result is that although during the experiment, on searches for the term “Elance,” Elance’s ad
received 100 times as much traffic as oDesk’s, with Elance’s ad out of the way, oDesk did not gain
substantial additional clicks.
In the United States, online advertising experts predict that in 2014, companies will spend $20
billion on online brand advertising (ads designed to build consumer awareness, interest and loyalty
in their brands) and $30 billion on online direct response advertising (ads designed to elicit a spe-
cific action such as an online purchase).2 Advertisers purchase sponsored search ads, the ads that
appear along with search results on search engines including Google and Bing, primarily as direct
response marketing, but also for branding purposes. Additionally, advertisers defensively purchase
search ads to block their competitors’ ads from appearing or being featured prominently. One rea-
son to do so is if competitors gaining business now would hurt an advertiser’s future prospects,
such as if a market has network effects or a winner-take-all dynamics.
Search engines including Google sell their ads via real-time auctions in which advertisers bid
on search terms.3 Companies may generally bid on ads for their own and their competitors’ trade-
marked terms. Search engine marketing experts claim that trademark owners and competitors play
a version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) when bidding on trademarked search ads, and that own-
ers must bid aggressively to block competitors from poaching their potential traffic.4 However,
advertisers cannot easily verify this claim and optimize their advertising campaigns accordingly
for two reasons. First, they need a sufficient amount of exogenous variation in advertising behav-
ior. Second, they need data from competing businesses. Using our combination of experimen-
tal evidence and novel data sets from Elance and oDesk, our results suggest that the trademark
2According to eMarketer, a large online market research firm: http://www.emarketer.com/Article/
Direct-Response-Tactics-Take-Majority-of-US-Marketers-Budgets/1010852. Accessed
August 8, 2014.
3Appendix A1 describes search ad auctions in more detail.
4For example, see this blog post at Search Engine Land, a popular blog and resource for
search engine marketing professions, which calls allowing a competitor to outbid you on your
own trademarked terms an “obviously untenable situation”: http://searchengineland.com/
how-to-protect-brand-keywords-for-less-121566. Similarly, in the legal literature, Gervais
et al. (2013) argues that trademark owners bid on their own terms to block their competition.
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owner/competitor game is not in fact a PD.
Table 1.1 shows two possible, simple game structures that we consider as candidates to model
the trademark owner (O) and competitor (C) search ad bidding game. The first, in Table 1.1a,
demonstrates the PD game in which bidding is a dominant strategy for both players. Its story
goes as follows: if competing O and C both bid on search ads for O’s trademarked terms, the
auctioneer benefits by earning more revenue than if either company instead does not participate.
The companies could collude and not bid, each saving on advertising expenses to their mutual
benefit, but if O decides to stop bidding on its own terms, then C will poach traffic from O’s terms
by bidding, making unilateral deviation on O’s part a bad move. Similarly, if C decides to not bid,
O will get an increased share of the traffic, making unilateral deviation on C’s part a bad move as
well. The second, in Table 1.1b, demonstrates a different game with a single difference: poaching
is less effective, and so O has less to lose by not bidding (and C thus gains less). Hence, O does not
bid in this game’s Nash Equilibrium. Our experimental evidence suggests that many advertisers are
likely playing a game more accurately described by Table 1.1b, where bidding is less effective than
they think at blocking their competition, and they should thus not bid on their own trademarked
terms.
Prior to merging, Elance and oDesk typically each occupied the top advertising position in
Google searches for its own name (“Elance” and “oDesk” respectively), and usually occupied the
second position for the other company’s name. Both businesses target their search ads at potential
new employers. During our experiment, as the experimental treatment, Elance unilaterally stopped
bidding on all of its Google search ads, including all of its ads on both general and trademarked
terms, in half of the United States, randomized geographically.5 Any company which is currently
bidding on its own trademarked terms could estimate the savings they would attain by stopping
their ads. However, to estimate a key presumed cost of not bidding, lost business to competitors,
a company would need both exogenous variation in their own advertising on these terms and ac-
cess to their competitors’ data. We meet both of these conditions since we introduced exogenous
5Many websites including Google and Elance use IP Geolocation software to estimate the location of their users
based on their IP addresses. Elance did not geographically target its other non-Google ads, including its smaller search
ad campaigns on other search engines, towards or away from the treated areas in the experiment.
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variation via our experiment, which we conducted before Elance and oDesk combined their online
advertising operations, and we analyze the results of the experiment after the companies merged,
using data from each company’s advertising campaign and relevant business metrics.
Prior to the experiment and during the experiment in the regions where Elance continued to
purchase Google search ads, Google searches for the term “Elance” would generally show an ad
for Elance in the top position and an ad for oDesk in the second position. Users making these
searches only clicked on oDesk’s ad about 1% as often as they clicked on Elance’s ad. This ex-
tremely low percentage may indicate that these searches were typically “navigational” in nature,
meaning that users searching for “Elance” appear to have generally been using Google to navigate
to their intended destination website, as opposed to searching to explore or discover different web-
sites.6 When the companies were competitors, Elance of course did not know that oDesk received
relatively few clicks on its ads targeting the “Elance” term. However, the fact that there were few
clicks on oDesk’s ads suggests, misleadingly, that Elance had a lot of downside risk if they chose
to not bid, because oDesk could have potentially captured a large amount of Elance’s traffic from
the “Elance” term by outbidding Elance. When Elance turned off its own ads in half of the U.S.
during the experiment, oDesk’s ads on the term “Elance” moved into the top advertising position.
However, surprisingly, oDesk received nearly the same number of clicks on its ads in the half of the
U.S. where Elance shut its ads off as in the half where Elance kept its ads on. This result suggests
that Elance did not need to purchase ads for its own term in order to block its closest competitor
from poaching its users.
Beyond considering only advertising on trademarked terms, we assess the broader effects on
oDesk’s overall ad campaign of Elance shutting its ads off. We predicted that these effects would be
large since we thought that Elance and oDesk’s search ad campaigns were aggressively competing
head-to-head, but instead we find relatively modest effects of smaller magnitudes than we expected,
but in the expected directions.
We conclude our analysis with a comparison of the causal effect of Elance’s search ads on its
6Navigational queries are extremely common. According to Mashable, in 2012, the top Google queries
was for “Facebook” and the number 3 query was for “Google” itself. Queries for the name of a very
well known website are generally considered navigational. See: http://mashable.com/2012/12/07/
top-google-searches-2012/.
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business with the typical correlation-based naive measures of ad efficacy. Without an experiment
or some other source of exogenous variation in advertising, we could not tell if a potential customer
who clicks an ad and registers on Elance would have otherwise registered absent the ad. With the
data from a typical search ad campaign, we can track which registered users arrived at a website
via a click on a search ad. We compare the number of registrants we can track to a click on a
search ad (the naive estimate) with the number lost from turning the ads off (the causal estimate)
and find that these estimates are significantly and substantively different. In particular, we find that
the naive method overestimates the number of new users who registered due to search ads, and
thus overestimates the value of these ads. The experimental estimate is 70% as large as the naive
estimate. We conclude the analysis by estimating the impact of Elance’s ads on oDesk’s business,
which we find to be small and insignificant.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides additional legal and market context. Sec-
tion 1.3 explains our experiment design. Section 1.4 presents our hypotheses. Section 1.5 describes
the empirical methods we use to estimate our results. Section 1.6 shows the results of the experi-
ment and we conclude in Section 1.7.
1.2 Legal and Market Context
1.2.1 Legal Context of Ads on Trademarked Search Terms
Search ads appear on search result pages for a variety of keywords, included both trademarked and
non-trademarked terms.7 Advertisements on trademarked keywords comprised 7% of Google’s
revenue as of April 2004,8 the latest date for which this figure is publicly available. Revenues
from trademarked keywords as a share of Google’s total revenue are plausibly higher today, as
Google has both permitted and encouraged more advertising on trademarked terms over the years.
7Trademarked terms are also known as brand terms in the advertising community. The conflicting meanings of
“brand” in this context, as either trademarked keywords, or ads designed to promote a brand, are unfortunately con-
fusing. We call ads triggered by trademarked keywords, “trademarked” ads for expositional purposes.
8Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 155-156 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Joint Appendix, Vol. IX, Tab
41, Ex 6, “Google Three Ad Policy Changes” at p. 4264-4265). Rosetta Stone initially filed this case in 2009 and the
parties settled in 2012.
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In the U.S. prior to April 2004, Google allowed trademark holders to, upon request, block other
advertisers from both advertising on their trademarked terms, and from including these terms in
their ad text. Later in 2004, Google changed its policy to no longer allow trademark holders
to block ads on their trademarked terms. Then in 2009, Google began to allow advertisers to
include trademarked terms in their ad text under certain circumstances.9 Additionally, Google has
introduced and refined software tools, such as its Keyword Suggestion Tool, to suggest and aid in
the discovery of relevant keywords, including trademarked terms, for advertisers to consider for
their advertising campaigns.
Companies have complained to Google for allowing competitors to bid on search ads for their
trademarked terms or to include these terms in search ad text. Several companies have sued Google
over these issues, in both the United States and the European Union. In the U.S., in Rescuecom
Corp v. Google and in Europe, in Louis Vuitton v. Google, the plaintiffs asserted that Google
illegally allowed their competitors to bid on their trademarked terms.10 Also in the U.S., in Rosetta
Stone v. Google, Rosetta Stone asserted that Google illegally both allowed competitors to bid on
Rosetta Stone’s trademarked terms and to use these terms in their ad text.11 Beyond direct concerns
about possibly losing potential business to competing search advertisers, these companies argue in
their cases that competing advertisers dilute their brands by confusing consumers, and in some
cases, that these competitors are committing outright fraud, by misrepresenting themselves as the
plaintiff’s brands. The fact that advertisers spend billions of dollars per year specifically on search
ads for trademarked terms explains why both Google has devoted resources to intricate trademark
advertising policy changes and companies have initiated high-profile, costly lawsuits disputing
search advertising on their trademarked terms. Bechtold and Tucker (2014) address the public
policy issues surrounding the application of trademark law to search ads.
9Google’s current AdWords Trademark Policy grants resellers and informational sites limited permission to use
trademarked terms in their ad text. Google’s current policy is available here: https://support.google.com/
adwordspolicy/answer/6118?hl=en. Accessed August 8, 2014.
10Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 126-127 (2nd Cir. 2009). Rescuecom initially filed this case in
2006 and dropped it in 2010. Court of Justice of the EU, Google France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, Mar. 23, 2010,
Joint Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, ECR 2010, I-02417. Louis Vuitton initially filed this case in 2008, and the Court
of Justice of the European Union ruled on it in 2010.
11Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152 (4th Cir. 2012).
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1.2.2 Market Context
After competing aggressively as the two largest online labor markets for years, Elance and oDesk
merged during our experiment. Combined, freelancers completed $750 million of work on the
two platforms in 2013.12 A survey article provides an overview of how these markets work, the
research being conducted on them, which countries are working and hiring, the types of work be-
ing performed and wage rates (Agrawal et al., 2013). They show a general pattern on oDesk of
high-income country employers hiring low-income country freelancers, at hourly rates substan-
tially higher than the minimum wages in the freelancer’s country. Horton (2010) provides further
background on the optimal design of these markets.
Elance and oDesk fought to bring new users to their platforms by purchasing search ads on a
variety of terms, including both generic terms and each other’s trademarked terms. A trademark
owner has many possible reasons to care about the effects of competing advertisers bidding on
their trademarked terms, beyond the direct effects on sales and search ad costs. Competing ads
may dilute the value of a brand, and in some cases, have been misleading or fraudulent, as in the
legal cases described in Section 1.2.1. In our setting, Elance cared specifically about potential
business being lost to oDesk due to the the potential winner-take-all dynamics of their competing
network-based online marketplaces. As such, Elance historically bid on its own name to keep
oDesk from poaching potential customers via search advertising. Sayedi et al. (2014) propose a
more complicated game to model the relationship between poaching in search advertising, and
spending on traditional advertising, such as television and newspaper ads. In our setting, both
Elance and oDesk primarily engaged in online advertising.
1.3 Experiment Design
The experiment design is fairly simple. During the experiment, Elance shut off all of its Google
search ads in a randomly selected half of the Direct Marketing Areas (DMAs) in the United States
12www.Elance-oDesk.com. Accessed August 8, 2014.
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for a period of 28 days, starting on March 11, 2014.13 There are 210 DMAs, which subdivide the
country into regions and they were originally designed for television-based advertising targeting.
Advertisers can target Google ads geographically by DMA. The treated DMAs were selected com-
pletely at random, without stratification. After the experiment, Elance resumed bidding on search
ads in the entire U.S., as it had before the experiment. Where relevant, we compare this experi-
mental period to the 220 day pre-experimental period from Aug 1, 2013 to March 9, 2014. We
use a longer pre-experiment period than the duration of the experiment to improve the precision of
our estimated effect sizes. Prior to the experiment, Elance did not target or vary search advertising
purchases within the U.S. geographically.
The experiment setup is similar to a an experimental study on eBay’s search ad campaigns
(Blake et al., 2014). Both experiments share one business goal of estimating amount of business
generated by search ads, however, the novel setting of our experiment running during the Elance-
oDesk merger process allows us to analyze the competitive effects of the experiment on oDesk’s
ad campaign and business.
Elance did not announce this experiment publicly to avoid strategic interference from other
bidders. In particular, oDesk could have potentially disrupted the experiment by making different
changes to its bidding behavior in the treatment and control DMAs during the experiment, if Elance
told oDesk about the experiment, if oDesk discovered the experiment’s effects independently, or
if oDesk happened to make disruptive changes to its advertising campaigns during the experiment
for reasons unrelated to the experiment. However, during the experiment, oDesk neither changed
its bidding behavior overall nor did it specifically target its bids geographically within the U.S. The
only changes oDesk made to its bids during the experiment in the U.S. applied to the entire U.S.
These changes were minimal, and followed an overall bidding strategy that did not change during
the experiment.
13 Due to two independent problems, both unrelated to the experiment or its results, but which coincidentally
occurred on consecutive days during it, there is a gap of seven days (which we call the “Omitted Period”) without
useful data during the experiment, so the effective experiment length is 21 days. The first problem is unexpected
Elance bidding behavior (as described by the Elance marketing department) that occurred for three days resulting
in substantially fewer ad impressions those days, and the second is a denial of service attack against Elance which
resulted in four days of lost or unusable data. Days in which either of these two problems occurred, along with the day
before the start of the experiment (during which Elance tested out the experiment for part of the day) are omitted from
our analysis.
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The two companies concluded the process of merging coincidentally during the experiment,
one week prior to the end of the experiment. Prior to the conclusion of the merger, the companies
needed to operate as separate, competing entities, and as such, Elance did not inform oDesk about
the experiment. In preparation for the anticipated conclusion of the merger, neither Elance nor
oDesk made any substantial changes to their bidding during the experiment period prior to the
merger (aside from Elance running this experiment). Following the conclusion of the merger, no
major changes were made to oDesk’s bidding strategy until after the end of the experiment period,
both to facilitate completion of the experiment and to allow the new company enough time to
formulate an updated search advertising strategy. We return to the subject of a competitor’s best
response to an advertiser dropping out of an ad auction in Section 1.7, our conclusion.
The experiment’s duration was limited by business concerns. Simulation-based a priori power
analysis suggested that we run the experiment for a minimum of two weeks, a duration we expected
would yield somewhat imprecise, but usable results to assess the overall performance of Elance’s
ad campaign. As noted across a variety of ad campaigns by Lewis and Rao (2013), attaining a
large enough sample size to achieve the statistical power necessary to evaluate a campaign can be
a significant challenge. In the case of our experiment, ideally, we would be able to randomize at the
individual level, rather than the DMA level, to gain more power, however, doing so is not possible
with currently available ad targeting and tracking options.
1.4 Hypotheses Development
1.4.1 Effects on oDesk’s Search Ad Campaign
Google auctions its ads using the Generalized Second-Price (GSP) mechanism, described in detail
in Appendix A1. Table 1.2 describes the metrics which summarize the ad campaign, and our pre-
diction of the effect the experiment would have on oDesk’s campaign overall, and specifically on
the “Elance” term. Based on the features of the GSP mechanism, we expected that oDesk’s cost
per click (CPC) would go down whenever Elance’s ads would otherwise have occupied the ad po-
sition one below (i.e. worse) than oDesk’s, and otherwise oDesk’s CPC would remain unchanged.
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We thus expected oDesk’s CPC to go down overall. Similarly, oDesk’s position would decrease
(i.e. improve) by exactly one if Elance’s ad would outrank oDesk’s, and otherwise would remain
unchanged. We thus expected oDesk’s position to improve (i.e. decrease) overall. oDesk’s position
improvement would equal the share of auctions in which its ad and Elance’s ad were displayed,
and Elance’s ad’s position was better.
Hence, we know the expected direction of the effects of the experiment on oDesk’s CPC and
position based on the search ad auction’s features, but the magnitudes of these effect sizes depend
on how aggressively oDesk and Elance were competing with each other with their search ad cam-
paigns. If Elance and oDesk had both bid in all of the same search ad auctions and bid equally
aggressively so that their quality score adjusted bids (see Appendix A1) were generally close, then
oDesk’s position would have improved by approximately 0.5 and its CPC would have decreased
substantially (as long as, in the cases where Elance was one position worse than oDesk, the next
highest bidder’s quality adjusted bid was substantially lower than Elance’s). If instead the two
companies did not bid in any of the same auctions, then neither oDesk’s CPC nor position would
change. If there was overlap, but oDesk outranked Elance with all of its ads, then position would
not change at all, but CPC would still potentially go down. Based on internal Elance market re-
search, we believed that oDesk and Elance were fierce competitors for search ads, so we expected
the experiment to decrease oDesk’s CPC substantially. Since the two companies did not target the
exact same set of keywords, we thus expected position to improve by somewhat less than 0.5, but
still by a substantial amount. For the term “Elance”, since Elance was in position 1 and oDesk was
in position 2 generally, we expected oDesk’s position to decrease by 1 (becoming 1), but its CPC
to remain unchanged.
oDesk’s ad impressions count would go up in cases where the Elance ad would have been
the worst-ranked ad shown, and oDesk’s ad was the highest ranked ad that was not shown. This
specific situation is rare overall, and was non-existent for the term “Elance,” so we expected a
very small overall increase in impressions overall, but no increase for the term “Elance.” Clicks
generally increase with more impressions and better position, so we expected clicks on oDesk ads
to increase overall, primarily due their improved position, and to increase for the term “Elance”
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entirely due to the improvement in position from 2 to 1. We further expected oDesk to get more
clicks due to the absence of Elance’s ad, independently of the effects of clicks due to position and
impressions. Ads in position 1 generally receive substantially more clicks than ads in position 2
(Jansen et al., 2013), so we expected a particularly large increase in clicks on oDesk’s ads on the
term “Elance,” a key prediction we will return to in section 1.6.1. We made no prediction about
the overall cost of oDesk’s ad campaign. We expected more clicks (increasing cost), but lower
CPC (reducing cost), and had no general expectation about the relative size of these two effects,
but we did expect cost on the term “Elance” to increase substantially, via an increase in clicks, but
no change in CPC.
1.4.2 Effects on Elance and oDesk Business
Online advertisers typically track incoming visitors to their sites to help them assess the efficacy
of their ad campaigns. Typically, online advertising software, including Google’s will show an
advertiser the number of new users (or other metric the advertiser chooses) that clicked on an
ad. Advertisers typically use this observational, correlation-based measure as a naive estimate
of the amount of new business they gain from an ad campaign. It is naive because it assumes
a possibly unrealistic counterfactual, that absent the ads, none of the users who clicks on them
would have signed-up for the advertiser’s site. Previous research (Lewis et al., 2011) conducted
randomly controlled trials in advertising across a variety of online settings and demonstrated by
comparing observational and experimental estimates that observational methods can drastically
overestimate the efficacy of online advertisements. For example, their first experiment (Section
2 in their paper) showed that the naive estimate of an advertising campaign was over 200 times
as large as the causal point estimate, and that this naive estimate decreased only slightly when
adding in relevant controls. Blake et al. (2014) found similar overall results when experimentally
analyzing eBay’s search ads. Their Table 3 shows a small, statistically insignificant causal effect
of their ads, compared to a naive estimate on the order of 100 times as large (depending on which
controls are used).
Both Elance and oDesk primarily used search ads to attract new employers to their services, so
11
the number of new employer registrations is the metric we use to quantify the effects of Elance’s
ads on both businesses. Table 1.3 shows our predictions of the experiment’s effect on new employer
registrations for both companies. Our experiment provided us with an estimate of the percentage
of Elance’s new employer registrations resulting from search ads (i.e. that we tracked to a click
on a search ad) which we should attribute to the choice to run the ad. Adver This percentage is
equal to 100% only if none of the new registrations would have occurred absent the ads, meaning
that a potential new employer would not have found Elance via an organic search result or some
other method of discovery. We expected some of this substitution to other ways of discovering or
deciding to use Elance, but not a tremendous amount since Elance was not a generally well known
brand (we will return to this point in the conclusion). Overall, we thought that Elance would lose
a substantial amount of new business by turning its ads off. Elance dropping out of the ad auction
would have to at least weakly help oDesk’s business by increasing its ads’ exposure and number
of clicks. Based on our predicted effects on oDesk’s overall ad campaign as described in Table 1.2
and a pre-merger estimate that search ads accounted for a large, but non-majority share of oDesk’s
new employer registrations, we expected a slight increase in this metric for oDesk.
1.5 Empirical Methods
To account for pre-experiment differences across the different DMAs, we evaluate all results using
a difference-in-difference approach via the following fixed-effects regression:
Yit = f(β1 ∗ AdsOffit + δt + γi + it) (1.1)
i indexes the 210 different DMAs, t indexes time periods and f(·) is a function. We aggregate the
results into two time periods: “before” and “during” the experiment. Yit is the outcome variable
and β1 is the coefficient of interest. AdsOffit is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 for
observations of treatment DMAs during the experimental period. δt and γi are the time and DMA
fixed effects, respectively, and it is the error term. In all results, we cluster standard errors at the
DMA level.
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We wish to model the effect of turning Elance’s ads off as causing a percentage change in some
outcome variables, including the number of new registrations per DMA, rather than a change in
levels. Different DMAs represent different populations, both overall, and of pre-treatment Elance
and oDesk employer registrations. The amount spent per DMA on advertising pre-treatment is
roughly in proportion to each of these population. Thus, for example, if we consider two DMAs,
A and B, where A represents ten times the population of B, we would expect the search ads to cost
ten times as much in A as B and to bring in ten times as many employers, but to bring in a similar
percentage of total new employers within each DMA.
For variables where we expect and wish to estimate a percentage change, we model f(x) =
exp(x) and estimate the results using the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE).14
We prefer this estimator to taking the log of Yit and estimating via OLS because some of our out-
come observations are equal to 0.15 For other variables where we expect a linear change, primarily
the ad position, we simply model f(x) = x, and estimate via OLS.
1.6 Results
We first present and discuss the raw data, foreshadowing the formal experimental results which we
turn to afterwards. Table 1.4 summarizes before and during experiment data, in both experiment
cells (the treatment and control group DMAs). Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 show time series plots of
the experiment data for oDesk’s ad campaign for the term “Elance” (Figure 1.2) and overall ad
campaign (Figure 1.3), and oDesk and Elance’s business metrics (Figure 1.4).
Table 1.4 shows that oDesk’s ads on the term Elance had a large change in position (−0.96)
and substantial changes in clicks and cost in the “difference-in-difference” cells of the table. Other
variables in oDesk’s campaign on the term Elance, as well as all variables in oDesk’s entire cam-
paign, did not change substantially. Elance’s user registrations were down substantially in the
14Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Wooldridge (2002) describe and motivate the use of this estimator. This estimator
does not assume that V ar(Y |X) = E(Y |X), as the name Poisson might misleadingly suggest, for consistency or
asymptotic normality, and it has nice efficiency and robustness properties (Wooldridge, 2002).
15In practice, for some outcome variables there are few observations equal to zero, and in these cases, we get similar
results when we estimate using OLS, and either use log(Yit + 1) as our outcome variable, or drop observations where
Yit = 0.
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treated DMAs, but oDesk’s were not.
In Figures 1.2 and 1.3, we see that the search ad metrics varied over time and that oDesk’s
overall ad campaign followed somewhat different patterns from its ads on the term Elance. In
Figure 1.2, oDesk’s position for the term Elance was relatively consistent before the experiment,
yet oDesk’s position varied much more overall as seen in Figure 1.3, and has some distinct trends
over time. Similarly, impression counts fluctuated more overall than for the term Elance. Clicks
and cost fluctuated substantially both overall and for the term Elance. Like position, cost per click
(CPC) follows some time trends overall as well. Overall, there were only very slight differences in
these metrics between the two experimental cells in the pre-experiment period.
Before the experiment, oDesk did not bid on the term Elance for a short period, as seen in
all of the panels of the Figure 1.2. Impressions for the term Elance increased modestly several
months before the start of the experiment, and substantially about a week before, remaining higher
post-experiment than before. Impression counts could have varied due to a variety of changes in
the following areas: number of searches for this term, oDesk’s bidding behavior, other advertisers’
bidding behavior and Google’s auction algorithm.
Figure 1.4 shows that Elance registered almost the same number of new clients pre-experiment
in the treatment and control cells, yet fewer during the experiment in the treatment group. oDesk
registered fewer clients in the treatment group both before and during the experiment.
1.6.1 The Experiment’s Effects on oDesk’s Advertising Campaign
We first analyze the effects of the experiment on oDesk’s Google ad campaign for searches on
the keyword “Elance” (Table 1.5), then for oDesk’s overall Google ad campaign (Table 1.6), by
estimating Equation 1.1 using the different ad outcome metrics described in Table 1.2. In all cases,
the treatment group is the set of DMAs where Elance turned its ads off, and in the control group,
they remained on. The results confirmed some of our predictions, but refuted others.
First, as expected, oDesk’s ad position for the keyword “Elance” improved by almost exactly 1,
and impressions remained almost exactly the same (Table 1.5, columns 1 and 2), indicating that the
treatment worked as expected for these terms. But, surprisingly, even with both this improvement
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in position and with Elance’s ad out of the way, clicks did not increase (column 3), and in fact,
the point estimate is negative (-18%), though not statistically significant. If oDesk had instead
captured all of the search ad clicks Elance lost by not running its ads, oDesk would have received
approximately 10,000% more clicks (a coefficient of approximately 100). We reject the hypothesis
that oDesk even doubled their clicks, an effect 1
100
as large (a coefficient of approximately 1) and a
result which would have still yielded an insubstantial amount of new business for oDesk. In terms
of the simple model represented by Table 1.1, where Table 1.1a represents a simple Prisoner’s
Dilemma game where bidding on one’s own trademarked terms blocks competitors from getting
searchers to click their ads, and Table 1.1b represents an alternative game where such bidding is
less effective, these results show that Table 1.1b better models the competition between Elance
and oDesk for ads on the term “Elance”. oDesk’s changes in cost and CPC are not statistically
significant (columns 4 and 5), but are not precisely estimated.
The effect on oDesk’s overall ad campaign was smaller than expected. Position did decrease as
expected, but the estimated, statistically significant effect (Table 1.6, column 1) implies that only
5.5% of searches which triggered an oDesk ad contained a better positioned Elance ad. Clicks
increased as expected (columns 3), although the point estimate of 2.8% is not statistically signif-
icant. Likewise, CPC decreased by a statistically significant 7.0% (column 5). If these effects
were larger, especially the CPC estimate, they would have suggested that the merged company was
harming itself by bidding against itself, and thus should bid less aggressively in one or both of its
campaigns, or make other changes to avoid competing with itself.
1.6.2 The Experiment’s Effects on Elance’s and oDesk’s Businesses
We next analyze the effect of shutting down Elance’s Google ads on Elance’s and oDesk’s busi-
nesses. Table 1.7 shows the business impact of the experiment as estimated by using Equation
1.1, on the new user metrics described in Table 1.3. The point estimate in column 1 suggests that
Elance lost approximately 23% of its new employers by turning its search ads off.16
We wish to test two hypotheses about the efficacy of these ads for Elance. The first is that
16The experiment did not introduce separate exogenous variation in advertising on trademarked and non-
trademarked terms, so we are unable to identify separate impacts of advertising for these two groups of terms.
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the ads were completely ineffective, and that any relationship between the ads and new employer
registrations is entirely non-causal. This is a test that βˆ1 = 0 in Table 1.7, column 1. We reject
this hypothesis at the conventional 0.05 level using a two-sided t-test, with a p-value of < 0.001,
as the estimate is both statistically and substantively significantly higher than zero. The second
hypothesis is that each employer who registered after clicking a search ad was causally induced
to register because of the ad. In other words, this hypothesis states that without search ads Elance
should have lost the proportion of new employers tracked to a search ad click in the control group.
Based on the proportion of new registrations Elance tracked to a search ad click in the control
group, this is a test that βˆ1 = −0.338 in Table 1.7, column 1. This assumption, that each click
tracked through to a registration should be credited to the ad campaign, is a standard one marketers
would use to assess the performance of a search ad campaign, if they were not concerned about
causality. We also reject this hypothesis at the conventional 0.05 level using a two-sided t-test,
with a p-value of 0.0002.
We thus estimate that the causal impact of these ads is about 70% of the naive estimate. Thus,
this experiment provides evidence that these search ads were less than 100% as effective as the
naive estimate would suggest. However, the gap between the experimental and naive estimates
in this experiment (the naive estimate is 1.4X the causal estimate) is much smaller than the ones
implied by Blake et al. (2014) for search ads (a 100X difference) and Lewis et al. (2011) for
online display ads (a 200X difference), suggesting that the naive methods for assessing online
advertising campaign effectiveness are less biased for our campaign than for the campaigns in
these experiments. We suspect that the primary reason for this difference is because Elance is a
less generally well-known brand than the brands in these other studies. However, the fact that
this gap is still substantial suggests that even in Elance’s case, optimal bidding must take it into
account. Following the completion of the experiment, the merged company used this result as an
input to its updated bidding strategy, by bidding lower than the estimated optimal level implied by
the naive estimates.
Finally, we also assess the impact on oDesk’s business. We fail to reject the null hypothesis
that Elance’s ad campaign had no effect on oDesk, that is, that βˆ1 = 0 in Table 1.7, column 2. The
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point estimate suggests that oDesk registered approximately 0.9% more employers as a result of
Elance turning its ads off. This small estimated impact of Elance’s search ads on oDesk’s business
is unsurprising considering the modest impact of Elance’s search ads on oDesk’s search ads that
we estimated in Section 1.6.1.
1.7 Conclusion
Our results show that oDesk did not gain a significant amount of the search ad traffic Elance lost
when it stopped bidding on its own search term. Most experts would not have predicted this result,
and they instead claim that companies must bid on their own terms to prevent competitors from
reaching their customers. This discrepancy raises the question of whether our results generalize
to other advertisers bidding on their own trademarked search keywords. If it does, then many
advertisers are needlessly spending money defending their trademarked terms by bidding on them.
We suspect this result does in fact generalize in many cases, because Elance and oDesk both
behaved like typical advertisers on Google and there was nothing particularly unusual about their
competition over search ads for each other’s trademarked terms. Both companies were large search
advertisers during the experiment, but were far from being the largest. Like the vast majority of
search advertisers, neither had conducted a randomized controlled trial with their search ads prior
to this experiment. Both companies bid on a variety of keywords, not just trademarked terms. For
some keywords, they faced intense competition from each other and other advertisers, while for
others they did not. There is nothing to suggest that Elance and oDesk’s competition over search
ads for the term “Elance” was in any substantial way different from search ad competition between
other businesses over their trademarked search terms.
In our experimental setting, oDesk did not respond to Elance stopping some of their ads as
described in Section 1.3. In a more general setting, a competitor might respond to a business stop-
ping some or all of their search ad purchases by bidding more or less aggressively, either overall, or
only on some keywords, especially over a longer time horizon than our short experiment period.17
17Note that the GSP auction is not incentive compatible (Edelman et al., 2007) and see Appendix A1 for further
details on the GSP mechanism.
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Suppose Elance and oDesk remained competitors, and that Elance stopped bidding on search ads.
For the term “Elance,” oDesk should not have responded, but rather would have passively moved
from position 2 to position 1, and unhappily found out that their traffic did not increase substan-
tially from this term. For its overall ad campaign terms, oDesk’s best move to reoptimize depends
on the other remaining bidders, so we we are unable to predict the best response to Elance drop-
ping out of the auction, but because of the relatively small impact Elance’s participation had on
oDesk’s campaign, we suspect oDesk’s optimal bid changes in this scenario would be small. If
oDesk bid to spend a fixed marketing budget, which is a common, though not universal practice
among search advertisers, then oDesk’s lower CPC would allow it to increase its bids and acquire
more clicks. Of course, if Elance were to drop out of the auction, it would lose the substantial
amount of new business these ads generated for it regardless of exactly how oDesk would change
its bids in response.
The results in Blake et al. (2014) suggest that eBay’s search ads were not very effective in many
cases. The authors attribute this result to eBay being a well-known brand. Users who clicked on a
search ad and subsequently made a purchase on eBay would likely have made their purchase if not
shown the ad because they already knew about eBay. We share this view, and because Elance is a
far smaller company than eBay and is substantially less well known, we did not necessarily expect
their results to generalize to Elance’s overall search ad campaign efficacy. Rather, our results
complement theirs and together provide evidence consistent with the view that the gap between
the naive and causal estimates of a company’s search ad campaign effectiveness increases in the
company’s size. Following our experiment, we now believe that employers clicking on Elance’s
search ads generally would not have signed up without the ads.
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Table 1.1: Game models of the search ad auction when a trademark owner bids against a competi-
tor, with best responses in bold.
Competitor
Bid Don’t
O
w
ne
r Bid -3,-1 3,-4
Don’t -4,3 0,0
(a)
Stylized payoff matrix for the search ad
bidding game for trademarked terms if it
is truly a Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this case,
the trademark owner should defend its key-
word by bidding.
Competitor
Bid Don’t
O
w
ne
r Bid -3,-1 3,-4
Don’t -2,1 0,0
(b)
Stylized payoff matrix for the search ad bidding
game for trademarked terms if the competitor
does not gain as much business as in 1.1a when
the owner does not bid. In this case, the trade-
mark owner should not bid.
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Table 1.2: Description of advertising metrics and predicted effects of the experiment on oDesk’s
Google ad campaign.
Outcome Prediction
(Ads using the
“Elance” term)
Prediction
(All terms)
Description
Cost per click
(CPC)
Remain the same Decrease
substantially
Total cost divided by total clicks.
Position Decrease by ≈ 1 Decrease by < 1 The average position of the ad on
the search results page. 1 indicates
the top position on the page, which
is most likely to get clicked.
Impressions Remain the same Increase slightly Count of total times an ad is
shown.
Clicks Increase
substantially
Increase
substantially
Count of total times an ad is
clicked on.
Cost Increase
substantially
Unsure Total cost of the ad campaign.
This table shows the predicted effects of turning Elance’s search ads off on oDesk’s ads using the “Elance”
trademarked keyword, and all oDesk ads, for each of five search ad metrics.
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Table 1.3: Description of Elance and oDesk business metrics and predicted effects of the experi-
ment on them.
Outcome Prediction Description
Elance
Employer
Registrations
Decrease substantially, but by somewhat
less than number of new employers who
clicked on a search ad
Number of new em-
ployers who register on
Elance
oDesk
Employer
Registrations
Increase slightly Number of new em-
ployers who register on
oDesk
This table shows the predicted impact of turning Elance’s search ads off on Elance and oDesk’s business
outcomes.
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Table 1.4: Mean variable values before and during the experiment, by experiment cell, with differ-
ences and difference-in-differences
Variable Control Treatment Difference
oDesk ads on “Elance” term
Position, before experiment 1.97 1.98 0.01
Position, during experiment 2.11 1.17 −0.94
Difference 0.14 −0.81 −0.96
Impressions, before experiment1,2 1.00 0.97 −0.03
Impressions, during experiment1,2 2.26 2.21 −0.05
Difference1,2 1.26 1.24 −0.02
Clicks, before experiment1,2 1.00 1.16 0.16
Clicks, during experiment1,2 1.64 1.59 −0.05
Difference1,2 0.64 0.43 −0.22
Cost, before experiment1,2 1.00 1.06 0.06
Cost, during experiment1,2 2.16 1.93 −0.23
Difference1,2 1.16 0.87 −0.29
Cost per click, before experiment1 1.00 0.91 −0.09
Cost per click, during experiment1 1.31 1.21 −0.10
Difference1 0.31 0.30 −0.01
oDesk ads entire campaign
Position, before experiment 3.42 3.45 0.02
Position, during experiment 3.71 3.67 −0.03
Difference 0.28 0.23 −0.06
Impressions, before experiment1,2 1.00 0.99 −0.01
Impressions, during experiment1,2 0.81 0.79 −0.02
Difference1,2 −0.19 −0.20 −0.01
Clicks, before experiment1,2 1.00 1.00 −0.00
Clicks, during experiment1,2 0.98 1.00 0.02
Difference1,2 −0.02 0.01 0.03
Cost, before experiment1,2 1.00 1.00 −0.00
Cost, during experiment1,2 1.17 1.16 −0.01
Difference1,2 0.17 0.16 −0.01
Cost per click, before experiment1 1.00 1.00 0.00
Cost per click, during experiment1 1.19 1.15 −0.04
Difference1,2 0.19 0.15 −0.04
Elance and oDesk new user registrations
Elance registrations, before experiment1,2 1.00 0.99 −0.01
Elance registrations, during experiment1,2 1.02 0.80 −0.22
Difference1,2 0.02 −0.19 −0.21
oDesk registrations, before experiment1,2 1.00 0.89 −0.11
oDesk registrations, during experiment1,2 1.15 1.03 −0.12
Difference1,2 0.15 0.14 −0.01
Some variables are normalized to protect proprietary data.
1 Variable normalized to equal 1 in the control group before the experiment.
2 Variable normalized per day.
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Table 1.5: oDesk ads on “Elance” term estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Yit: Position Impressions Clicks Cost Cost Per Click
Method: OLS QMLE QMLE QMLE QMLE
AdsOffit -0.938∗∗∗ 0.009 -0.184 -0.171 0.230
(0.033) (0.059) (0.135) (0.125) (0.145)
N 408 420 420 420 241
Each column shows the estimated impact of Elance shutting down its Google ads on
different aspects of oDesk’s Google ad campaign for the term “Elance”. All estimates
include DMA and time-period fixed effects and are estimated using Equation 1.1.
Standard errors are clustered at the DMA level and are in parentheses. Columns (1)
and (5) contain fewer than 420 samples because position and CPC are only defined if
there are any impressions and clicks, respectively, in a time period-DMA observation.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 1.6: oDesk ads entire campaign estimates
Yit: Position Impressions Clicks Cost Cost Per Click
Method: OLS QMLE QMLE QMLE QMLE
AdsOffit -0.055∗∗ -0.018 0.028 -0.007 -0.070∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027) (0.035)
N 408 420 420 420 408
Each column shows the estimated impact of Elance shutting down its Google ads on
different aspects of oDesk’s entire Google ad campaign. All estimates include DMA
and time-period fixed effects and are estimated using Equation 1.1. Standard errors
are clustered at the DMA level and are in parentheses. Columns (1) and (5) contain
fewer than 420 samples because position and CPC are only defined if there are any
impressions and clicks, respectively, in a time period-DMA observation.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 1.7: New user registrations estimates
(1) (2)
Yit: Elance Registrations oDesk Registrations
Method: QMLE QMLE
AdsOffit -0.229∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.030) (0.036)
N 420 420
Each column shows the estimated impact of Elance shutting down its Google ads on
either Elance or oDesk’s new client registrations. All estimates include DMA and
time-period fixed effects and are estimated using Equation 1.1. Standard errors are
clustered at the DMA level and are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 1.1: Google search results including oDesk and Elance ads and organic results
This annotated screenshot shows an illustrative Google search results page from a search query on which
Elance and oDesk bid on search ads. It shows an Elance ad in position 1 and an oDesk ad in position 2 in
the top ad block, along with 8 other ads from other businesses in the right ad block. Elance appear as the
seventh organic search result, and oDesk appears as the fourth and fifth organic search results. This search
was conducted on June 6, 2014.
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Figure 1.2: oDesk search ad campaign for the term “Elance”
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This Figure shows daily search ad metrics for oDesk’s search ad campaign for the term “Elance”. The
vertical line in each plot separates the before and during experiment periods. The horizontal lines are the
means for the treatment and control groups, during each of the two periods. Randomization was done at
the DMA level. Observations are at the DMA-day level and each data point represented in the figure is an
aggregation to the experiment cell-day level. The vertical axes are unlabeled to protect proprietary data.
Data are omitted for the seven day “Omitted Period” during the experiment period, as described in Section
1.3. 27
Figure 1.3: oDesk search ad campaign, overall
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This Figure shows daily search ad metrics for oDesk’s overall search ad campaign. The vertical line in
each plot separates the before and during experiment periods. The horizontal lines are the means for the
treatment and control groups, during each of the two periods. Randomization was done at the DMA level.
Observations are at the DMA-day level and each data point represented in the figure is an aggregation to the
experiment cell-day level. The vertical axes are unlabeled to protect proprietary data. Data are omitted for
the seven day “Omitted Period” during the experiment period, as described in Section 1.3.
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Figure 1.4: Elance and oDesk new client registrations
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This Figure shows daily new client registrations for Elance and oDesk, which both aimed to increase via
search advertising. The vertical line in each plot separates the before and during experiment periods. The
horizontal lines are the means for the treatment and control groups, during each of the two periods. Random-
ization was done at the DMA level. Observations are at the DMA-day level and each data point represented
in the figure is an aggregation to the experiment cell-day level. The vertical axes are unlabeled to protect
proprietary data. Data are omitted for the seven day “Omitted Period” during the experiment period, as
described in Section 1.3. 29
A1 Description of Search Ad Auctions
This Appendix provides the relevant background material describing search ad auctions to give
context to the experiment presented in this paper. For further details, please see Varian (2007) and
Edelman et al. (2007), two papers which provide a more general overview and analysis of search
ad auctions.
When users search Google, it generates two separate sets of ranked results related to the search
term: organic search results and paid ads. Figure 1.1 shows an example search engine results
page which includes both search results and paid ads. Other popular search engines, such as Bing,
work similarly, and face similar constraints and objectives. We will describe the system which
determines which ads get displayed, in which positions and at what cost to the advertisers.
Google sells its search ads via “generalized second-price” (GSP) auctions. These algorithmic
auctions happen in real-time, nearly instantly, triggered by each search. Google’s ad inventory
consists of potential ad positions in which to show an ad impression, up to some maximum number
per page. This inventory is highly heterogeneous, as advertisers target their ad copy and their bids,
which they submit in advance, to specific search terms.
We can think of Google’s short-term goal as maximizing expected revenue from each search,
and its long-term goal as maximizing expected discounted revenue from future searches. Although
Google’s unit of inventory is an impression, advertisers generally submit bids not on impressions,
but on clicks on the search terms on which they wish to advertise. These bids are known as cost
per click (CPC) bids. Google computes a bid-modifying quality score for each advertisement in
an auction as a function of various quality metrics (Varian, 2007), including Google’s estimate of
the ad’s click-through rate (for a given position), which is the percent of users who see the ad that
click on it. Search engines, including Google, generally do not make public their exact methods for
scoring an ad. In the short-term, Google maximizes revenue by maximizing the cost per impression
to advertisers, which is equal to the cost per click, multiplied by the click-through rate. However,
seemingly paradoxically, Google generally displays no ads for some of the most popular search
queries, searches for the names of the most popular websites, such as “Google” and “Facebook”.
These queries are generally navigational, meaning that users are searching for the names of these
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sites in order to navigate to them, not to discover other search results and more information, thus
a relatively low proportion of users would likely click on ads on results pages for these terms. In
the short term, ads on these terms would still generate positive revenue and it would be optimal for
Google to show them. But, showing poor quality ads may discourage users from paying attention
to all ads in the future, harming future revenue, which is one reason why some searches yield zero
ads or fewer than the maximum number of ads (another more obvious reason is if there are few or
no bidders for a particular search term).
Ads are positioned by the rankings of their scores. There is generally a reserve price in an ads
score and/or bid. When a user clicks on an ad in position i, the GSP mechanism determines that
the advertiser pays the minimum amount (or slightly more) that would keep their ad’s score just
above the ad in position i+ 1. That is, the advertiser pays approximately the following per click:
CPCi =
bidi+1 ∗ scorei+1
scorei
(A1)
See Figure 1.1 for an example of the results of one instance of this auction process.
Advertisers seek to maximize their surplus from the search ad auction as a function of their bid
(including the choice to not participate by not bidding). As discussed in Varian (2007) and Edel-
man et al. (2007), the GSP mechanism differs from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism
in that it has no dominant strategy equilibrium, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium. Rather, ad-
vertisers can have an incentive to bid below their valuation, because in some cases doing so results
in a less prominent, but less expensive ad position which yields higher surplus to the advertiser.
The GSP mechanism is thus subject to strategic manipulation, even when advertisers know their
true valuations. In practice, advertisers do not know their true valuations and estimating them is
difficult, adding additional complexity to their optimal bidding problem.
Edelman et al. (2007) document the early history of search ad auctions, and the GSP mecha-
nism’s predecessors which led to it, including a generalization of the first-price auction mechanism
introduced by Overture (now part of Yahoo) in 1997 where advertisers paid their bid for each click.
This mechanism led to inefficient outcomes in which advertisers developed bidding robot software
to rapidly manipulate their bids (to attempt to just barely outbid competitors). Varian and Harris
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(2014) recounts the early history of search ad auctions at Google, which first started selling search
ads via an auction in 2002, using the GSP mechanism (initially developed primarily by computer
engineer Eric Veach), to address the problems with the generalized first-price mechanism. Rec-
ognizing the advantages of a truthful mechanism, Google later considered switching from GSP to
VCG, but did not for several reasons, one of which is that advertisers would have to raise their bids
to re-optimize their campaigns if this switch were to happen (and if they did not, revenue would
fall), as well as the problem that the VCG auction is difficult to explain to advertisers (Varian and
Harris, 2014).
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CHAPTER 2
The Importance of Preferences in Sectoral Sorting:
Direct Evidence from Lawyers in the Private and
Nonprofit Sectors
2.1 Introduction
In this paper we study the market for entry-level lawyers, who make dramatically less in the non-
profit sector than in the private sector. In data from a broad survey of lawyers in 2002, two years
after they graduated (the After the JD survey), the average annual difference in 2002 is $51,000.
There are two broad classes of explanation for such a pay gap: differences in worker skill (ability),
or differences in job characteristics (amenities) which workers value due to their preferences. We
present several pieces of evidence to suggest that differences in skill are not the whole explana-
tion, and instead we find a strong role for preferences. In our data, we have questions regarding
preferences for job characteristics among lawyers in both the private and nonprofit sectors and so
we are able to present some direct evidence that these preferences for job characteristics play an
important role in understanding the equilibrium in this market.1
In particular, we show that preferences among lawyers in the nonprofit and private sectors are
quite different and we attribute a large component of the private-nonprofit sector wage gap to these
differences. While pay in the private sector is responsive to law school rank, pay in the nonprofit
1 Weisbrod (1983) and Leete (2001) have previously documented that observable differences in skill do not fully
explain the private-nonprofit sector pay gap. However, they do not have preference questions in their data.
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sector is not. Nonprofit lawyers from higher ranked schools, who on average give up more income
to join the nonprofit sector, also have stronger preferences to be in the nonprofit sector.
We pursue several complementary empirical strategies to show the importance of preferences
in explaining the pay gap. First, in our primary empirical analysis, we estimate wage equations
with and without preferences, under the assumption that preferences are directly correlated with
private sector earnings. Second, we exploit the panel nature of our data to present within-lawyer
evidence based on the subset of our sample that switches sectors. Third, we examine the subsample
of lawyers who switch plans during law school. All three of these empirical strategies imply that
preferences play a large role in explaining the pay gap between the private and nonprofit sectors.
Our preferred estimates from our first strategy imply that entry level lawyers faced an average
opportunity cost to work in the nonprofit sector of $21,000 per year, just under half of the raw
wage gap, or $33,000 if they worked the longer hours typical in the private sector. We estimate
that the non-hours adjusted opportunity cost ranges from $5,000 - $11,000 per year from lawyers
from tier 3 and 4 law schools to $59,000 per year for lawyers from top 10 law schools (as ranked
by US News and World Report).
While the theory of compensating differentials predicts that a worker should earn less in a job
that has desirable amenities, researchers have had mixed empirical success in confirming this pre-
diction. The mixed success has generated a parallel literature explaining why this prediction is not
borne out in labor markets. One class of explanations focuses on issues in measuring unobserved
worker productivity (e.g. Hwang et al. (1992)). Another class of explanations focuses on the pres-
ence of search frictions and firms’ incentives to create amenities (e.g. Hwang et al. (1998), Lang
and Majumdar (2004), Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009) and Sullivan and To (2012)).
We focus on a labor market where high quality data and institutional features make the above
issues potentially less problematic. Unmeasured productivity differences are likely to be less prob-
lematic because we have reasonably detailed data on skill. Search frictions are less likely to be
important in shaping market outcomes since entry-level lawyers are relatively aware of job oppor-
tunities, are relatively mobile, and the market itself is relatively well organized. While the special
features of our empirical setting may limit the easy generalizability of our results to other labor
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markets, it does suggest that some of the empirical failures of the theory of compensating differ-
entials are due to looking at excessively broad markets, without detailed enough data. A series
of detailed case studies might paint a different portrait of the role of compensating differentials in
the labor market than attempts to measure compensating differentials using less detailed datasets.2
Though self-reported preference data raise issues of interpretation, we are reassured that the an-
swers are representative of true preferences, because we show that they allow us to predict future
behavior.
This paper makes several contributions. Our primary contribution is to show that the entry-
level legal labor market presents a clear case of sectoral sorting based on underlying preferences,
on which we have direct evidence. The closest paper along this dimension is Hurst and Pugsley
(2011), who report survey evidence on the importance of non-pecuniary motives for entrepreneur-
ship. However, they do not have evidence on the preferences of non-entrepreneurs and so are not
able to study sorting directly.
Our second contribution is to study the nonprofit sector pay gap with explicit questions about
preferences, while also attempting to account for self-selection. In previous work in this literature,
Preston (1989), Leete (2001), and Ruhm and Borkoski (2003) estimate the compensating differen-
tial for nonprofit work. Preston (1989) finds some evidence of pay gaps for nonprofit work among
managers after controlling for some observables but Leete (2001) finds that these gaps shrink to
zero after controlling for more detailed observables. Ruhm and Borkoski (2003) argue that “com-
petitive” pay setting is dominant, finding no strong evidence of compensating differentials, includ-
ing in panel estimates of sector switchers. Weisbrod (1983) estimates the compensating differential
for nonprofit legal work in particular and Leete (2001) includes case studies of particular sectors
of work, including the legal sector. Both papers find that controlling for observables alone yields
a large unexplained pay gap between the nonprofit and private sector that they attribute to com-
pensating differentials.3 Unlike Leete (2001) and Weisbrod (1983), Goddeeris (1988) attempts to
explicitly account for sorting between the private and nonprofit legal sector, and finds that sectoral
2Indeed, Rosen’s handbook chapter concludes with a call for better data: “the greatest potential for further progress
rests in developing more suitable sources of data” (Rosen (1986, pg. 688)).
3Frank (1996) argues that the legal pay gap is due to preferences.
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selection on unobserved ability can account for all of the sectoral pay differences (though the esti-
mates are imprecise). This result is frequently cited as demonstrating the absence of compensating
differentials for nonprofit work (e.g. Ruhm and Borkoski (2003); DeVaro and Brookshire (2006);
Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009); and Delfgaauw and Dur (2010)).
Our data allow us to build on these papers in several important ways. A central challenge in
these papers is that they do not have direct measures of preferences, yet they attribute to prefer-
ences the pay gaps that are not explained by observables, leaving open the possibility that some
part of the pay gap not explained by observables is actually due to unobserved skill differences,
rather than preferences. Our preference questions allow us to directly demonstrate that preference
differences play an important role. There is a dispute across these papers studying the nonprofit
sector about how to control for industry and occupation. In particular, Leete (2001, Table 3) argues
that by adopting finer industry and occupation controls than Preston (1989), she overturns many
of Preston’s results. By looking within an industry and occupation, we sidestep this difficulty. Our
work is thus more similar to the within-industry case studies presented in Leete (2001, Table 5)
using the 1990 Census PUMS dataset, however, we use surveys of lawyers (like Weisbrod (1983),
except the surveys we use are more recent, cover a broader range of lawyers, and have a much
larger sample size) with targeted questions such as law school GPA, which let us better control for
worker ability.
Our third contribution to the literature is to document important heterogeneity in the opportu-
nity cost of working in the nonprofit sector by skill, which is an interesting feature of the equilib-
rium. We are only aware of one paper which has explored this aspect of equilibrium across the
nonprofit and private sectors. Mocan and Tekin (2003) look within the child care industry and
find a substantial pay premium to working in the nonprofit child care sector and that pay differ-
ences between sectors depend on skill, rather than there being a single wage gap. We estimate that
lawyers from highly rated law schools face a substantial opportunity cost, whereas lawyers from
lower ranked schools only give up a little to work in the nonprofit sector.
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2.2 Data
We use data from two surveys of lawyers. The first, After the JD (AJD), is a nationally representa-
tive panel survey of new lawyers who first passed the bar in 2000 and has detailed information on
the factors, including preferences, that led the lawyers to choose their first jobs. AJD surveyed the
lawyers in two waves, first in 2002-2003 and then again in 2007-2008. The second, the University
of Michigan Law School Alumni Survey (UMLS), covers one particular law school. Its key bene-
fits are that it provides law school performance measures that are comparable across students, and
it has information going back to the 1950s (based on surveys that started in 1966), so that we can
follow lawyers over more of their careers and track changes in the nonprofit and private sector over
time. Unlike AJD, it does not have detailed data on preferences. We use the first survey wave from
AJD in our primary analysis, and use its second wave, along with the UMLS data, in additional
analysis and robustness checks.
Our datasets are more detailed than the datasets typically used when estimating compensat-
ing differentials. In these datasets, all lawyers would appear to be very similar in terms of their
education level (graduate) and sector, and these datasets do not have the critical questions about
preferences.
See Appendix B1 for more details on the datasets and how we construct our variables.
2.2.1 Sectoral Definition
Our main grouping, “sector,” classifies workers into three groups: private sector, government or
nonprofit. Throughout this paper we define the nonprofit sector to exclude almost all types of
government lawyers.4 However, we do include public defenders and legal service workers in the
nonprofit sector.5 For completeness, we include the government sector in our descriptive statistics,
4We exclude government workers in our definition of nonprofit workers for several reasons. First, excluding gov-
ernment is standard in the literature: Leete (2001), Preston (1989), and Ruhm and Borkoski (2003) exclude government
work. Second, the government sector has advantages relative to the private sector in terms of job security and benefits
so that looking solely at wages would be misleading and we do not have substantial information about benefits from
either data set. Third, as Sauer (1998) shows, the “option value” of government work is larger than for the nonprofit
sector in terms of later opportunities to move into more highly paid private sector jobs.
5We include these workers for several reasons. First, Weisbrod (1983) and Goddeeris (1988) include them. Second,
the alternative classification is to include at least some of these lawyers in government. In particular, public defenders
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however, we do not discuss this sector in detail because it is not the focus of this paper.
2.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 shows in the AJD dataset the basic empirical facts about lawyer characteristics and entry-
level earnings that this paper addresses. First, lawyers in the private sector make on average just
over twice as much as lawyers in the nonprofit sector, or $51,000 more per year on average.6 Private
sector lawyers make just under twice as much per hour on average as nonprofit lawyers, because
private sector lawyers work somewhat longer hours.7 Second, while there are some differences in
measures of law school quality and performance between the two sectors, it is not clear how much
of the pay gap these differences explain. For example, while private sector lawyers are more likely
than nonprofit lawyers to have a GPA of 3.5 or higher, nonprofit lawyers are more likely to have
graduated from top 20 law schools (as ranked by US News and World Report).
Table 2.2 shows that the essential sectoral patterns found in AJD’s representative sample of all
lawyers are true of lawyers from the University of Michigan Law School five years after graduation
as well: the private sector lawyers on average make more than twice as much as the nonprofit
sector lawyers. Moreover, this pay gap is even harder to explain based on observables than in
are directly employed by the government while legal services receive some funding from government. Thus, it might
be desirable to group the public defenders into government. However, the AJD does not distinguish public defenders
from legal service workers. Furthermore, our discussions with various lawyers and with staff at the University of
Michigan Law School Office of Career Planning suggested that public defenders and legal service lawyers do not
perceive themselves to be government lawyers, and that the “type” of law student who goes into government work is
very different than the “type” that goes into public defense or legal services.
6As a crude additional comparison, we calculate average annual earnings for 28 year olds (the average age in
the 2002-2003 AJD data set, which does not vary by sector) in 2003, with a completed bachelor’s degree, but no
further higher education, who are working full-time, in the Current Population Survey IPUMS release. This sample
makes $46,000 per year, or slightly more than the average nonprofit lawyer in the 2003 AJD dataset. This comparison
suggests that nonprofit lawyers are substantially worse off financially for going to law school, because they face 3 years
of lost wages and tuition expenses in law school, and are positively selected compared to the average undergraduate
student, so their wages had they not gone to law school would likely be above average.
7The AJD survey question asks, “How many hours did you actually work last week, even if it was atypical?
(Include evenings and weekends worked.)” Contrary to our expectations, weekly hours of work and hourly wages are
slightly negatively correlated for private sector workers (ρ = −0.26), nonprofit workers (ρ = −0.10) and a pooled
sample of both (ρ = −0.20). One obvious source of bias is if highly paid lawyers report fewer hours of work than
they actually typically worked, for example, if generally well paid lawyers at large law firms work more than 40 hours
per week, but report 40. We examined the distribution of hours for private sector lawyers in the data and though we
find bunching at 40, we also find bunching at all increments of 5 between 35 and 65, with the largest peaks at 50 with
slightly smaller peaks at 40 and 60. Thus, it appears that the question effectively elicits real variation in hours, which
reduces our concerns about this source of potential bias.
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the AJD data, partially since the lawyers in the UMLS are more similar because they all went to
the same law school. The average hours gap across sectors is smaller than in AJD. GPAs come
from administrative data and are represented in standard deviations from the mean. The first year
GPAs, are based on a common set of courses and are identical between the private and nonprofit
sectors. The fact that the mean GPA in standard deviation units is greater than 0 among respondents
suggests that higher GPA students were more likely to respond. Note that because these salary
measures are taken among more experienced lawyers than in AJD 2002-2003, they are not directly
comparable to those in Table 2.1.
2.2.3 Key Features of the Data
In this section we document four features of the AJD data about the entry-level legal labor market
and then show that they are consistent with a simple model of sorting.
Throughout the paper, we use law school rank in 2003 by U.S. News and World Report as our
primary proxy for skill.8 Because law school admission is selective and competitive, law school
rank is correlated with measures of skill.9 In Section 2.5, we offer more detailed evidence on
sectoral sorting in the setting of a single school, the University of Michigan Law School, which
makes it easier to interpret data on GPA compared to looking across schools using AJD.
2.2.3.1 Lower Returns to Skill in the Nonprofit Sector
The upper panel of Figure 2.1 shows that graduates of higher ranked law schools have annual com-
pensation distributions in the private sector that are right-shifted relative to graduates of lawyers
from lower ranked schools. In particular, lawyers from top 20 law schools have salary densities
that peak at around $150,000 a year, whereas lawyers from schools ranked 21 and below have an
annual compensation distribution centered at just over $60,000. It is clear from this picture that
in the private sector attending a better law school is associated with substantially higher average
annual compensation.
8This is the only school ranking available in AJD, and it is grouped to protect respondent privacy.
9For example, LSAT scores are increasing in law school tier.
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Turning to the nonprofit sector, the lower panel of Figure 2.1 shows that in the nonprofit sector
the salary distributions are virtually identical regardless of law school tier, in stark contrast to the
private sector. This pay differentiation by tier in the private sector but not in the nonprofit sector
suggests that lawyers in the private sector are financially rewarded for skill, unlike lawyers in the
nonprofit sector.
2.2.3.2 The Central Role of Preferences in Sorting
The AJD survey contains of a set of 9 questions which allow us to directly study the role of pref-
erences in sectoral sorting.10 These questions allow us to directly test whether sorting conforms to
theory, because preferences play a central role in theories of nonprofit work and in the compensat-
ing differential literature more generally.11
Two of the questions about preferences are particularly important for deciding whether lawyers
enter the nonprofit sector. The first asks about the importance of the “opportunity to do socially
responsible work,” which is generally more prevalent in nonprofit work. The second question asks
about the importance of “medium to long-term earning potential.”
The top panel of Figure 2.2 shows that the importance of doing socially responsible work is
associated with sectoral location. In particular, among nonprofit sector lawyers, well over half re-
ported that the “opportunity to do socially responsible work” was extremely important to them (the
highest response option). In contrast, among private sector lawyers the distribution is more uni-
form, with less than 10% reporting that doing socially responsible work was extremely important
to them.
The lower panel of Figure 2.2 shows that there is similarly strong evidence of sorting into
sectors on the importance of “medium to long-term earnings potential.” Lawyers in the nonprofit
sector are much less likely than lawyers in the private sector to report that earnings potential is
important. The bar charts are essentially mirror images of each other.
10The precise wording is, “Thinking about the principal types of settings in which lawyers work (e.g., government,
large law firms, business), how important was each of the following factors in determining the sector in which you
began your professional career?”
11See Preston (1989), Frank (1996), and Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) as examples of models of nonprofit pay where
preferences play a central role. Rosen (1986) is the classic reference on compensating differentials where preferences
play a key role.
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Table 2.3 shows the results of a probit model on selection into the private and nonprofit sectors
to explore the roles of the skill, demographic and preference variables together. Column (1) does
not include the preference variables, then we add social responsibility preference to column (2),
and then further add earning potential preferences to column (3). Overall, this model suggests that
preferences play a much stronger role in sector choice than other possible factors.
In the first column, the point estimates suggest that private sector lawyers are somewhat neg-
atively selected on law school tier (e.g. a lawyer from a top 10 school is 3 percentage points less
likely to join the private sector compared to a lawyer from a tier 4 school). Though none of the
estimates are statistically significantly different from 0 individually, a χ2 test of their joint signifi-
cance rejects the null that they are all equal to 0 with a test statistic of 10.05 (p=0.040). In contrast,
the point estimates suggest that private sector lawyers are somewhat positively selected on GPA.
Lawyers with GPAs above 3 are about 6-8 percentage points more likely to join the private sector
than lawyers with GPAs below 3 (although we see from Table 2.1 that the vast majority of lawyers
have GPAs above 3. The χ2 test of the joint significance of the GPA variables rejects the null
with a test statistic of 15.03 (p=0.010). Additionally, men are 7.2 percentage points more likely to
join the private sector, and this estimate is highly significant. Overall, these factors alone are not
tremendously predictive of sector choice. The pseudo-R2 of the model is 0.110.
In contrast, the social responsibility and earnings potential preference variables are much more
predictive. Adding them sequentially to columns (2) and (3) raises the pseudo-R2 to 0.307 and
0.373, respectively. χ2 tests of the significance of these sets of variables are highly significant,
with p < 0.0001. In column (2), we see that a lawyer with the strongest stated preferences to do
socially responsible work is 37 percentage points more likely to join the nonprofit sector, compared
to a lawyer with the lowest stated preferences. Similarly, in column (3), we see that a lawyers with
the strongest preferences for earning potential is 18 percentage points more likely to work in the
private sector. Adding the earnings potential preference variable does not significantly change the
estimated effects of the social responsibility variable. Adding both preference variables does not
substantially change any of the estimates from column (1), with the small exception of lowering
the marginal probability differential between men and women to 3.1 percentage points.
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While the other preferences questions are not our main focus, there are some differences in
responses by sector. Table 2.4 shows mean responses to all of the preference questions by sector.
The ability to pay off debt is most important to private sector workers, while the importance of loan
repayment programs is highest for nonprofit workers. These two patterns are unsurprising. Private
sector lawyers value prestige and future career mobility more than nonprofit lawyers. If anything,
these two factors are an additional benefit of having a private sector job. Finally, nonprofit lawyers
(and government lawyers) value work-life balance more than private sector lawyers, which makes
sense considering that private sector lawyers spend more time at work each week.12
2.2.3.3 Higher Skill Lawyers in the Nonprofit Sector Have Stronger Preferences
The right hand side panel of Figure 2.3 shows that the average importance of doing socially re-
sponsible work among lawyers in the nonprofit sector is increasing in the quality of the law school.
This increase is relatively small, however, which is not surprising given that Figure 2.2 shows
that there is little variation in the response to this question among lawyers in the nonprofit sector.
The other preference variable, importance of earnings potential, displays more variation within the
nonprofit sector both overall and by school tier. It shows that lawyers in the nonprofit sector from
higher-ranked schools value earning potential substantially less than lawyers from lower ranked
schools: the average importance falls from a 4 to a 2 as we move from schools ranked 101 and up
to top 10 schools. The preferences over earnings potential are strongly, negatively correlated with
law school rank among nonprofit sector lawyers.
A potential concern is that these patterns simply reflect differences in preferences common
across all lawyers from each tier of law school. The left hand side panel shows that this is not the
case: these preferences do not vary substantially across tiers in the private sector.
12One potential downside of the preferences questions is that they were asked in 2002-2003, at least two years
after the lawyers first decided where to work. This lag means that the responses might not reflect the lawyers’ ex-
ante preferences when they were making a career decision, but instead might reflect an ex-post justification for their
early career sector choices. Thus, the reported preferences might be uninformative about the basis of past decisions.
We show in Section 2.5 that the responses to preference questions in 2002 are correlated with movements between
sectors after this survey was conducted, so they are at least informative about future decisions, suggesting that they are
correlated with respondents’ true underlying preferences. Furthermore, respondents do not merely give the “polite”
answers of caring a lot about social responsibility and little about earning potential. Thus, we have at least some
evidence that respondents’ responses reflect their true career preferences.
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2.2.3.4 Distribution of Preferences are Independent of Law School Rank
Table 2.5 shows that the distribution of preferences in the AJD survey is roughly independent of
the strongest correlate we have of skill, law school rank. It shows the average response to the
two questions that we showed are important in determining sectoral location: importance of the
opportunity to do socially responsible work and medium to long-term earnings potential in your
choice of job sector. The table shows that the mean and standard deviation of the responses to both
questions are roughly constant across law school tiers.
2.3 A Conceptual Model of Sorting
The key features of the data we document are consistent with sorting on the basis of preferences
under one additional assumption: returns to skill are lower in the nonprofit sector than in the private
sector. The intuition is that because high-skill lawyers give up more pay to locate in the nonprofit
sector, those lawyers who do so will have stronger preferences to be there. To make this intuition
precise, this section develops a sorting model of a labor market with preference heterogeneity. The
model also highlights the fact that compensating differentials are heterogeneous in the presence
of such differentiated opportunity cost. We discuss the notion of the opportunity cost that we
estimate in the remainder of the paper as the difference between realized wages in one sector and
counterfactual wages in another.
2.3.1 Environment
Our model is a Roy (1951) model of sorting between the nonprofit and private sector on the basis
of comparative advantage in producing utility. Lawyers have a level of skill and a preference for
working in the nonprofit sector. The private sector pays more for skill than the nonprofit sector,
while the nonprofit sector provides more non-wage benefits from the type of work lawyers do in it.
Formally, each lawyer is endowed with skill denoted byX , which is a random variable, that we
assume is perfectly transferable across sectors. Most generally, X may either be a scalar or a vector
of observed and unobserved traits. Each lawyer also derives utility φ from working in the nonprofit
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sector, which is also a random variable. Consistent with our facts, let X and φ be independent.
Lawyers choose to work in either the private or nonprofit sector, which yield utility values u1
and u0, respectively. In the private sector, a lawyer would gain utility from their salary (w1), which
depends on their skills, returns to skills (β1) and a random draw of earnings, 1 so that the potential
utility in the private sector is:
u1 = w1 = Xβ1 + 
1,
where E[1] = E[1|X] = 0. In the nonprofit sector, a lawyer has different returns to skills (β0) and
has a modified intercept (δ), thus earning a salary of w0 = Xβ0+δ and they also receive additional
non-salary-based utility, φ, as well as a random utility draw 0 so that total utility is:
u0 = Xβ0 + δ + φ+ 
0.
2.3.2 Equilibrium: Sorting and Selection
A lawyer chooses a sector to maximize utility. In particular, a lawyer locates in the nonprofit sector
if u0 > u1 or equivalently:
φ > X(β1 − β0)− δ + (1 − 0) ≡ φ¯. (2.1)
If X is a vector, the model allows for comparative advantage, since some characteristics might
be more highly rewarded in one sector compared to another. Going forward though, since pay is
relatively flat in the nonprofit sector, we think of X conceptually as a scalar composite of skill
variables, ruling out comparative advantage.
Figure 2.4 depicts the resulting sorting of lawyers under two further simplifying assumptions:
β1 > β0, that is, returns to skill are higher in the private sector (as documented in Section 2.2.3.1)
and 1 = 0 (an assumption used here only to simplify the figure). Lawyers endowed with more
skill relative to their preferences sort into the private sector, while lawyers with stronger prefer-
ences relative to their skill sort into the nonprofit sector.
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Because preferences are not proportional to skill, the key feature of the equilibrium is that
the cutoff preference intensity to locate in the nonprofit sector is increasing in skill. This feature
has two implications. First, lawyers with more skill who are in the nonprofit sector have stronger
preferences to be there. Second, combining the rising preference cutoff with the fact that the
distribution of preferences are roughly independent of skill, there are fewer high skill lawyers in
the nonprofit sector and so the nonprofit sector is negatively selected.
2.4 Main Results
2.4.1 Empirical Model of Private Sector Wages
We develop a simple empirical model to predict lawyer wages in the private sector as a function
of ability, using law school tier and GPA as our primary predictors, which we then use to predict
counterfactual private sector wages for the nonprofit lawyers. We model log hourly wages in the
private sector as:
yi = Xiβ + i (2.2)
where yi is log hourly wages in the private sector, Xi are ability variables and i is an error term.
If sector choice is uncorrelated with  then Equation 2.2 not only models wages for private
sector lawyers, but also models counterfactual wages for lawyers who choose to work in the non-
profit sector, if they instead worked in the private sector. This counterfactual represents the wages
nonprofit lawyers would earn in the private sector if they earned the same wages as an equivalently
skilled private sector lawyer. We are unable to test this assumption directly and we test sensitivity
to this assumption in Section 2.4.4.
45
2.4.2 Wage Equation Estimates By Sector
Using our sample of private sector lawyers from AJD, we estimate Equation 2.2 via OLS, and show
the results in Table 2.6 in column 1. Table 2.6 shows that skill variables are strongly associated
with wages. Each higher level of law school rank and GPA is generally associated with an increase
in salary: a 55 log points increase for a top 10 school relative to tier 4 law school, and a 50 log point
increase for a GPA of 4-3.75 relative to 2.49-2.25. Being on a general or special law review and
being male are associated with higher wages, although the magnitudes of these effects are smaller
than those of law school rank and GPA.
Table 2.7 shows the analogous results within the nonprofit sector. The patterns are very differ-
ent, although the smaller sample size of this sector makes most of our estimates less precise. There
is no longer strong evidence of increasing wages in law school tier and GPA.
Table 2.8 shows similar cross-sectional estimates using the UMLS data for both sectors, 5 and
15 years after law school. Due to the smaller sample size, we pool over multiple class years,
include a linear graduation year trend, and use real earnings. The estimates from the UMLS fit a
key pattern we found using the AJD data: pay increases with GPA in the private sector, but not
significantly in the nonprofit sector. We estimate that 5 and 15 years after law school, a University
of Michigan lawyer in the private sector earns hourly wages 11 and 17 log points higher per unit
increase in the standard deviation of their first year GPA and these estimates are highly significant
and fairly precise. In contrast, the GPA point estimates in the nonprofit sector are about half as
large, are not significant since they are far less precise.
2.4.3 Estimates of Opportunity Cost of Working in the Nonprofit Sector
We calculate a counterfactual expected private sector wage for each nonprofit worker (E[yi|Si =
0]) using Equation 2.2. Using this counterfactual, we calculate an “individual opportunity cost”
(OCi) as the amount in log hourly wages we predict a nonprofit lawyer gives up to work in the
nonprofit sector instead of the private sector as:
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OCi = E[yi|Si = 0]− ynonprofiti (2.3)
where ynonprofiti are actual wages for nonprofit lawyers. We thus can calculate mean opportunity
costs based on the estimated empirical distribution of individual opportunity costs.
In Table 2.9, row 1 reports a mean estimated average opportunity costs of 45 log points based
on the estimates from column (1) in Table 2.6 using the AJD data. The mean raw log hourly
wage difference in the AJD data between the two sectors is 55 points. The 10 log point difference
between our estimated mean opportunity cost and the mean sectoral wage difference suggests that
nonprofit lawyers would earn less in the private sector than actual private sector lawyers. That
is, nonprofit lawyers are negatively selected on skill (following our model, Section 2.3.2), but not
nearly as much as the raw wage gaps predicts. Although this log points difference is small relative
to the raw wage difference, we reject the hypothesis that it is 0 and we also reject the hypothesis
that it is 55, the raw difference between the two sectors.
We also present estimates of opportunity costs using the UMLS data based on the estimates in
Table 2.8. In Table 2.9, rows 2 and 3, we estimate the opportunity cost of working in the private
sector 5 and 15 years after law school to be 64 and 78 log points, respectively. These estimates are
fairly precise and highly significant. Like the AJD estimates, these estimates suggest that lawyers
give up substantial potential earnings to work in the nonprofit sector.
We next translate these hourly wage estimates using the AJD data from logs into levels, and
then into annual wage estimates. Average hourly wages for nonprofit and private sector lawyers are
$21 and $40 respectively. Average annual wages are $44,000 and $95,000, respectively. Using the
logs-to-levels retransformation in Duan (1983), we estimate counterfactual average hourly wages
of $31 for nonprofit lawyers if they instead worked in the private sector. Nonprofit lawyers work
fewer hours per week on average than private sector lawyers, 40.5 hours compared to 48.1 hours.
At our estimated counterfactual hourly wage, in the private sector, nonprofit lawyers would make
an average of $75,000 per year working nonprofit hours, or $90,000 per year working private sector
hours.
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In Table 2.10, we show estimated average opportunity costs for nonprofit lawyers by law school
rank using the AJD data. These estimates support the theory that lawyers from stronger law schools
give up more pay to join the nonprofit sector. We estimate that lawyers from top 10 law school give
up 106 log points on average in hourly wages to join the nonprofit sector, which is significantly
different from the average opportunity cost of 45 log points. Our estimate of lawyers’ average
opportunity cost from tier 3 and 4 schools is much smaller, 16 and 20 log points respectively, and
both are significantly different from both 0 and the average opportunity cost. Thus our results
suggest that only lawyers from highly ranked schools give up substantial earnings to work in the
nonprofit sector.
2.4.4 Robustness of Estimated Opportunity Cost to Selection on Unobserv-
ables
We are concerned that if nonprofit lawyers are negatively selected on unobservable factors which
influence potential private sector wages (as in the model of Goddeeris (1988)), then we would
be overestimating their opportunity costs. We do not believe that our data include a credible in-
strument for sector selection, so instead we check the sensitivity of our estimates to selection on
unobservables. As a robustness check, we adopt the methods of Altonji et al. (2005) to explore
potential bias from sectoral selection on unobservables. We assume that there is potentially cor-
relation ρ between the error terms in the selection and wage equations, but, lacking a suitable
instrument, the correlation is not well identified. We estimate the Heckman (1979) model using
MLE, assuming bivariate normal error terms and that the preference variables belong in both the
wage and selection equations, but we constrain the correlation between the equations to a range of
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fixed values.13
We begin with a standard use of the law of total expectation to derive expected counterfactual
wages for nonprofit workers:
0 = E[] = E[|X] = PE[|P, S = 1] + (1− P )E[|P, S = 0] (2.4)
where P is the propensity to work in the private sector. We rearrange as:
E[|P, S = 0] = − P
1− P E[|P, S = 1] (2.5)
We thus construct counterfactual expected wages for nonprofit workers as though they worked in
the private sector as:
E[yi] = Xiβˆ − Pˆ
1− Pˆ E[|Pˆ , S = 1] (2.6)
using Pˆ and βˆ as estimated by the constrained Heckman model.
Table 2.11 shows the resulting mean opportunity costs for a range of ρ values between −0.5
and 0.5. As expected, estimated opportunity cost is decreasing in the correlation between the
unobservables in the selection and wage equations. A positive correlation between these terms
means that lawyers who are more likely to work in the private sector are positively selected into
this sector (e.g. they have favorable unobservables), which means that that observably equivalent
13 We also considered an alternative Heckman (1979) style model which allows sector selection based on unob-
servables, where we assume that the preference variables meet the necessary conditions to be excluded variables
to correct for sectoral selection. We estimated the model using the Heckman two-step method, as well as a semi-
parametric method which builds off of Chamberlain (1986); Heckman (1990); Cosslett (1991); Vella (1998); Newey
(2009); French and Taber (2011). This estimation strategy is similar to the one used by Goddeeris (1988). We are
not convinced that preference only influence wages via their influence on sector selection and the estimates from this
model suggested that nonprofit workers would make implausibly higher wages in the private sector than private sector
workers. In our data, we do not believe there are credible instruments for sector selection. We thus do not present
these results.
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nonprofit lawyers would have relatively lower wages in the private sector. Assuming no correlation
between the equations (ρ=0) is equivalent to the estimate in Table 2.9, row 1. In the AJD column,
the point estimate of the average opportunity cost remains positive for all values of ρ in our range,
and remains significantly for ρ < 0.5. The UMLS column shows very similar results. Thus, there
is evidence that selection on unobservables would need to be quite substantial to reverse our result
that nonprofit lawyers on average would earn more if they instead worked in the private sector.
2.4.5 The Role of Preferences Within the Private Sector
Jobs vary within the private sector not only by pay, but also area of law, types of clients and
other work conditions. We consider a versions of the model that includes our preference variables
(preferences for socially responsible work and earning potential) as predictors of wages within the
private sector:
yi = Xiβ + Ziα + i (2.7)
where Zi are preference variables. When we include these variables, we interpret them as repre-
senting choice of job characteristics within the private sector.
We consider estimates of Equation 2.7 in Table 2.6, including socially responsible preferences
(column 2), and both preference variables (column 3). Preferences do in fact influence wages.
When we include social responsibility preferences (column 2), the estimates on the ability terms
do not change significantly, and we estimate that private sector lawyers with strong social respon-
sibility preferences earn less. In particular, we estimate that the lawyers who care the most about
social responsibility (those with a 7) earn 21 log points less than lawyers who case the least (the
omitted group, those with a 1). When we next add earning potential preferences to our model (col-
umn 3), the estimates of the other coefficients again do not change significantly. We estimate that
lawyers with strong earnings potential preferences earn more: lawyers with a 7 earn 29 log points
more than those with a 1 (the omitted group). Both sets of social responsibility and earnings poten-
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tial preference are significant in tests that all of their coefficients are equal to zero, with F-statistics
of 3.45 (p=0.0022) and 4.10 (p=0.0003) respectively. These estimates suggest that preferences
have a strong influence on earnings for lawyers in the private sector.
2.5 Fixed Effect Analysis of Selection
2.5.1 Analysis of Sector Switchers
In this section we pursue a strategy to control for unobservables to augment our primary analysis:
we exploit the panel structure of both of our datasets to look at lawyers who switch sectors over
time, which allows us to estimate within-lawyer sectoral pay gaps and thus opportunity costs (in log
wages). We use standard panel data methods. This analysis supports our main results, and though
conceptually we gain power though paired observations of the same lawyers, we have small sample
sizes of sector switchers, which reduce power and thus limits our analysis somewhat.
If a random sample of lawyers switched sectors, then a fixed-effects model of within-lawyer
wage differences, including years after graduation fixed effects (at either 5 or 15 years after the ini-
tial survey year) would provide an unbiased estimate of the average opportunity cost of working in
the nonprofit sector as a more experienced lawyer. However, lawyers could switch non-randomly
as a function of their potential wages in both sectors, potentially biasing our estimates, although
since wages do not vary that much in the nonprofit sector, we are primarily concerned about vari-
ation in actual or potential wages in the private sector. Our estimates would not directly be biased
if lawyers switch non-randomly as a function of preferences, if preferences are unrelated to their
potential wages in both sectors.
The sector switchers also allow us to examine two other limitations of our previous analysis.
First, in Section 2.2.3.2 we were concerned that responses to the preferences questions in the AJD
survey might have reflected ex-post feelings or justification for career choices. Here we show
evidence that the preference responses are valid since the lawyers who switch sectors between the
two waves of AJD reported systematically different preferences in the first wave than those who do
not. The second limitation of our previous analysis is that we do not observe the actual law school
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or first-year GPA of AJD respondents. With sector switchers we can use our data from UMLS and
exploit the fact that the first-year GPA data is from the same set of classes at the same law school
to see how selection works on the basis of GPA.
2.5.1.1 After the JD
In After the JD, between 2002-2003 and 2007-2008, 17 lawyers switched from the nonprofit to
the private sector, and 29 switched from private to nonprofit.14 Table 2.12 shows the summary
statistics on the subsample of sector switchers.
The table makes three points. First, switchers in either direction do not appear to be substan-
tially selected on pre-switching sectoral earnings. In 2002, prior to switching, the lawyers who
eventually switched from the nonprofit to the private sector made 10 log points more in hourly
wages than the lawyers who did not. Prior to switching, the lawyers who switched from the private
sector to the nonprofit sector made 11 log points less.
Second, the movements in pay among the switchers reveal important sectoral pay gaps, even
within an individual. In 2007, the nonprofit sector lawyers who switched to the private sector
made 67 log points more than the lawyers who stayed in the nonprofit sector. Similarly, the private
sector lawyers who moved to the nonprofit sector saw their wages made 45 log points less than the
lawyers who stayed. These post-switching differences are far larger than the small pre-switching
differences between these groups.
More formally demonstrating the difference-in-difference approach, Table 2.13 shows two
fixed-effects regressions, including individual and wave fixed effects. The independent variable
of interest is the sector switching indicator in wave 2. Column (1), estimates that switchers from
the nonprofit to the private sector earn 57 log points more in hourly wages in 2007. Similarly,
Column (2) estimates that switchers from the private to the nonprofit sector give up 34 log points
in hourly wages in 2007. Both estimates are highly significant.
Third, reported preferences in 2002 are correlated with movements between then and 2007.
The lawyers who left the nonprofit sector reported weaker preferences to do socially responsible
14These are the observations for which there is wage data in both waves which also meet the other restrictions in
Appendix B1.
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work and stronger preferences for earnings potential than the lawyers who stayed. Similarly, the
lawyers who left the private sector reported stronger preferences to do socially responsible work
and valued earnings potential less than the lawyers who stayed in the private sector. These findings
suggest that the preference questions are meaningfully correlated with actual behavior and future
actions. They thus provide some evidence that the responses to the preference questions (in 2002)
reflect true sentiments about preferences at the time lawyers made their initial sector choice (in
2000), rather than solely being ex-post justification.
In combination, the switchers in both directions suggest the presence of large compensating
differentials for sectoral choice among lawyers. This finding is in contrast to the results in Ruhm
and Borkoski (2003) who find in the CPS that switchers in both directions earn small wage in-
creases, however, our results are not directly comparable. Though they analyze some occupations,
they do not specifically analyze lawyers.
2.5.1.2 University of Michigan Law School
The UMLS data also has sector switchers and we present a similar analysis for sector switchers
after 5 years. Since UMLS is a longer panel, we also present evidence from 15-year sector switch-
ers. Because of the smaller sample sizes of UMLS, we created pooled samples of 10 graduation
years (1991-2000 for the 5-year switchers and 1981-1990 for the 15-year switchers) and report real
(2002) wages, adjusted by the CPI. Unfortunately, only annual, not hourly earnings (nor hours of
work) are available in the first year, so we do all comparisons in log annual wages. However, we
feel this is a minor concern because differences in weekly hours of work between the two sectors
are small in the UMLS data (Table 2.2). The results are substantively similar to those from AJD.
The UMLS data allows us to examine two issues that the AJD data does not. First, we can ex-
amine longer-run salary differences between the sectors because we have a longer panel in UMLS.
Second, we can examine sorting on the basis of law school performance using within-school mea-
sures of GPA.
Table 2.14 makes four points about the salaries. First, as in the AJD data, the switchers from
nonprofit to private are not systematically selected on potential earnings. If anything, the switchers
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are negatively selected based on initial salary. For both sectors, those who eventually switched
made less initially. Second, switching from the nonprofit to the private sector yields substantial
wage increases relative to the stayers, and the raw differences are especially large 15 years out,
at 47 log points ($92,000) a year. Third, salary decreased for lawyers who switched within five
years from the private sector to the nonprofit sector, while the analogous fifteen year switchers ex-
perienced a relatively small increase in earnings. However, both the five and fifteen year switchers
away from the private sector make far less in the nonprofit sector than the lawyers who stay in the
private sector. Finally, as with the AJD data, the switchers make clear that the way to maximize
long-term earnings is to start in the private sector and stay there. Fifteen years into their careers,
lawyers who started and stayed in the private sector make over 73 log points more than those who
start in the nonprofit sector and switch to the private sector.
Table 2.15 shows the same fixed-effects regressions using the UMLS data as Table 2.13 shows
with the AJD data, yielding very similar results. Column (1) estimates that after 5 years, switchers
out of the nonprofit sector earn 28 log points more, although this estimate is not significant at
conventional levels (p=0.073), it is in the same direction as the comparable estimate from AJD.
Column (2) estimates that after 5 years, switchers out of the private sector earn 54 log points less.
This estimate is significant, and larger than the comparable one using the AJD data. Columns (3)
and (4) show the same set of estimates, using 15 years after law school as the second period, and
the estimated effects of switcher are larger after 15 years (69 and -75 log points, respectively) and
significant.
Table 2.14 makes two points about GPA. First, as we expect from the model, there is some
negative selection into the nonprofit sector on the basis of both first year and overall GPAs. Second,
however, this negative selection does not confound our analysis of switchers. The lawyers who
initially locate in the nonprofit sector and switch to the private sector have substantially lower
GPAs than those who stay, both 5 and 15 years out, while the evidence from GPAs on those who
switch from the private sector to the nonprofit sector is more mixed, because 5 year switchers
have slightly lower GPAs, while 15 year switchers have slightly higher GPAs. As with the AJD
switchers, the evidence from the UMLS switchers suggests that there is a large opportunity cost to
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working in the nonprofit sector.
2.5.2 Change of Sector Plans During Law School
The primary empirical concern with interpreting sectoral pay gaps as primarily reflecting prefer-
ence, rather than ability differences, is that sorting on unobserved ability might be the main driver
of sectoral pay differences. In the previous subsection, we explored pay gaps within-lawyers who
switched sectors once already in the labor force as a way of controlling for unobserved ability. Here
we explore two additional aspects of selection: selection on GPA within a particular law school,
and also selection on GPA of lawyers who change their planned long-term sectoral location while
in law school. The goal in both cases is to see the extent to which lawyers who eventually end up
in, or switch towards, the nonprofit sector are negatively selected.
The UMLS survey asks lawyers about what their long-term career plans were when they en-
tered and exited law school. We also know their law school GPAs at the end of their first year and
their cumulative GPA. Therefore, we can see if law students systematically switch into either the
private sector or nonprofit sector based on their performance during law school.
This analysis is similar to work by Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2011) on college major
choice. They show that students drop out of math and science majors as they get negative feedback
about their performance and update their beliefs about their own abilities, suggesting that math and
science get a positive selection of graduates.
The plans switchers suggest that, if anything, there is a positive selection of lawyers into the
nonprofit sector. Table 2.16 shows the GPAs (in standard deviation units) of lawyers by original
sector plans and the sector they ended up in. The lawyers who keep their plans of staying in the
nonprofit sector did better in law school (with first year and final GPAs of 0.30 and 0.42 standard
deviations above the mean, respectively) than those lawyers who started out planning on going
into the nonprofit sector and switched to the private sector (who had first year and final GPAs of
-0.04 and 0.02 standard deviations from the mean, respectively).15 Similarly, those students who
15 Since nearly all UMLS students take the same first-year classes, we focus on first year GPAs to avoid issues of
sorting into easier and harder classes in years 2 and 3. As Table 2.16 shows though, final GPAs are very similar to
first-year GPAs.
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entered planning on working in the private sector but ended up locating in the nonprofit sector did
better in law school (with an average first year GPA of 0.21 standard deviations above the mean)
than those students who stayed in the profit sector (with an average first year GPA of 0.16 standard
deviations above the mean). Regardless of which sector the students initially planned on going
into, the nonprofit sector appears to get a positive selection of students.16 We thus find no evidence
consistent with endogenous, positive selection on revealed ability into the private sector based on
UMLS students’ changing career plans during law school.
2.6 Alternative Potential Explanations for the Sectoral Pay Gap
While we have documented substantial pay gaps between the nonprofit and private sectors and
interpreted these gaps as at least partially representing opportunity costs due to preference differ-
ences, we consider several alternative potential explanations. None of them refute the notion that
nonprofit lawyers give up substantial wages to be in the nonprofit sector.
2.6.1 Lifetime Earnings
The entry-level wages that are the primary focus of our analysis, while convenient to use given the
available data, are not the best earnings metric if we think that lawyers value and optimize their
appropriately discounted lifetime earnings. If low entry wages for nonprofit lawyers lead to higher
wages later on than other career paths, then our analysis would overstate the opportunity cost when
viewed from a lifetime earnings perspective. However, our evidence suggests that the entry level
sectoral pay differences understate the relative lifetime ones.
We make two points. First, the salary changes of switchers from the nonprofit to the private
sector show that they make less than those who had started in the private sector, suggesting that
starting elsewhere and switching to the private sector is not a good strategy for salary maximization.
The evidence on sector switchers from AJD and UMLS in Tables 7 and 2.14 suggests that the way
to maximize later-career earnings is to start out in the private sector and stay there. The average
16 As with the UMLS graduates from 1996-2001 in Table 2.2, the 1982-1991 graduates who responded to the survey
have slightly higher than average GPA’s.
56
later-career salary in both data sources from only working in the private sector is substantially
higher than salaries for other career paths. The lawyers who start out in the nonprofit sector and
switch to the private sector do experience substantial pay increases, but they do not close the gap
with those who start out in the private sector.
Second, the lifetime income differences conditional on initial sectoral location are substantial.
In the UMLS dataset we have observations on lawyers 1, 4, 14 and 24 years after law school, for
the sample who graduated between 1976-1979, and we use these observations to estimate lifetime
income.17 The implied lifetime income gap (for the first 24 years of legal work) based on initial
sectoral location is large: the nonprofit starters have a lifetime income of about $1,000,000 and the
private sector starters have a lifetime income of about $2,400,000. This comparison demonstrates
a substantial lifetime earnings gap between lawyers based on their original sectoral choice and
likely underestimates the true lifetime earnings gap by not observing wages late in these lawyers’
careers. Furthermore, because the private-nonprofit sectoral wage gap has grown substantially
since the 1970s and especially during the 2000s, we expect the lifetime earning gap for more
recent law graduates to be even larger.
2.6.2 Debt Forgiveness
There are state, federal, and law school specific loan forgiveness and repayment programs for
lawyers, which have varied over time. These programs provide assistance in various ways, includ-
ing: ongoing debt assistance payments, reduced required monthly loan payments, and complete
debt forgiveness after a certain number of years. Depending on the program, lawyers qualify for
assistance by having a low income level and/or a job in the nonprofit sector (or in some cases, the
government sector). Typically, for assistance in the form of ongoing debt payments, the size of
these assistance payments decreases with a lawyer’s income.
These programs somewhat complicate our comparison of salaries between the nonprofit and
private sectors because typically a lawyer would receive more assistance in the nonprofit than the
17We convert each of these income observations to 2002 dollars and then impute salaries for the missing years by
geometrically interpolating the two nearest observations. We then discount this income stream back to the year of
graduation using a discount rate of 0.95.
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private sector. This difference, if ignored, would bias us towards overestimating the opportunity
cost of working in the nonprofit sector, but is only a major concern if it is actually large. Ideally,
we would estimate the value of loan assistance programs on an individual level to the lawyers
in our AJD sample, and their value if the lawyers instead chose the other sector, and we would
compare this estimated difference in assistance between the sectors to our estimated opportunity
costs. Unfortunately we are unable to directly estimate loan assistance values at the individual
level, due to a combination of factors: the overall complexity of these programs, their changes
over time and the fact that we do not have available the specific law school a lawyer attended in the
AJD data. However, the evidence we do have suggests that loan repayment programs are unlikely
to have a major impact on our estimates.
We make three points. First, the magnitude of debt, which generally is an upper bound on the
value of forgiveness programs, is dwarfed by the lifetime income differences between the sectors,
so debt forgiveness programs cannot go far in explaining the sectoral pay gaps. Tables 2.1, 2.2 and
2.17 show the average level of education-related debt (including undergraduate loans) at the time of
law school graduation by sector and law school rank, and it does not vary much by either factor. In
the previous section we documented that the lifetime pay differences are on the order of $1,000,000
dollars (likely an underestimate) in present discounted value terms, while the magnitude of debt
is on the order of $60,000. So, the magnitude of debt is inconsequential relative to the income
differences and thus debt and assistance programs do not seem like they could plausibly be playing
a central role in sectoral sorting.18
Second, the nonprofit lawyers generally do not report that debt assistance programs had a ma-
jor impact on their sector choice. One of the survey questions about sectoral choice introduced
in Section 2.2.3.2 asks about the importance of the “availability of loan repayment assistance or
18Two recent papers present evidence of a behavioral response to student debt that does not fit within standard
models. Their findings could argue against this point. Field (2009) documents that the mere framing of loan for-
giveness programs for NYU law students—whether as a loan forgiveness program conditional on sectoral location, or
as a tuition remission conditional on sectoral location—has a quantitatively significant impact on their probability of
going into the nonprofit sector. Rothstein and Rouse (2011) show that debt causes undergraduates in a highly selective
university to avoid public interest jobs, using evidence from a policy shift of replacing all student loans with grants.
However, there is also behavioral evidence supporting the notion that debt assistance programs might not play a role
in sector choice. Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006) finds that the complexity of undergraduate financial aid programs
hinders their intended use of inducing marginal students to go to college. Likewise, we suspect that the complexity of
loan assistance programs for lawyers reduces their impact on sectoral choice.
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loan forgiveness programs”. As shown in Table 2.4, private sector lawyers rate these programs of
low importance to them, with an average of 1.89 (where 1 is “Not Important at All” and 7 is “Ex-
tremely Important.”). Perhaps surprisingly, nonprofit sector lawyers give these programs a 3.65 on
average, indicating that they are not especially important to their choice of sector either. Nonprofit
lawyers from different law school tiers have similar average responses, except for lawyers from
top 10 schools, who have an average response of 6.3, indicating that they found these program
important.19 However, the annual sectoral pay gap is so large for lawyers from top 10 schools, at
about $100,000, that our argument that the lifetime earnings gap dominates the size of loans and
any possible assistance especially applies to these lawyers.
Finally, sectoral sorting over time has been insensitive to an increase in private sector annual
wages roughly equal to the entire average debt burden, among UMLS students. Over the 25 years
in our data, UMLS entry-level private sector wages have roughly doubled (in 2002 dollars), from
$60,000 to $120,000, while the entry-level nonprofit wages have remained relatively flat. This
change implies that the present discounted value of lifetime income lost to entering the nonprofit
sector has risen dramatically over this period, and by an amount far larger than that forgiven by debt
forgiveness programs. If debt forgiveness programs were playing a key role in inducing sorting,
then we would expect the increase in the pay gap to reduce the number of lawyers entering the
nonprofit sector, or to change the nature of selection. However, as shown in Figure 2.5 the share of
UMLS students entering the nonprofit sector has not shown a systematic relationship to these pay
gaps (and has been relatively flat over time). The GPA of UMLS students entering the nonprofit
sector has varied somewhat over this period, but if anything, it has increased in recent years as the
pay gap has increased.
2.6.3 Differences in Family Background
An alternative concern about our preference variables is if they are correlated with an important
omitted determinant of sector choice. In particular, if preferences are correlated with family back-
ground, and particularly financial educational support, then family background may play a role
19Higher-ranked law schools tend to have more generous loan assistance programs.
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similar to loan forgiveness programs, except perhaps on a larger scale.
However, there are not substantial differences in family financial support or background be-
tween the sectors. Table B3 shows how lawyers from AJD in different sectors paid for law school.
Though there are slight differences between the sectors and the response rate is low to these ques-
tions, overall the share of financial support from difference sources does not vary much by sector.
Federal loans are by far the largest source of support and are a slightly larger source for non-
profit lawyers than private lawyers, who received slightly more support from parents and from
employment (possibly through summer internships). Table B4 shows that there are only very
slight differences in education levels of lawyers’ parents between the sectors.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the role of preferences in determining labor market outcomes. In
particular, we have demonstrated that preferences strongly influence the sorting of lawyers between
the nonprofit and private sectors. Private sector lawyers have higher salaries than nonprofit lawyers,
yet, they are similarly skilled. We show that these preference differences explain a share of the
pay gap. The AJD data set we used contains excellent survey questions for studying the role of
preferences in sorting, and its use is new to the literature on preferences and sector choice.
Our most striking finding is that this pay gap is largest for higher-skilled lawyers because
the nonprofit sector appears not to financially reward skill, while the private sector does. We
presented evidence that there is correlation among lawyers in the nonprofit sector between skill
and preferences for being in the nonprofit sector. Together, these results imply that the opportunity
cost of joining the nonprofit sector for lawyers is heterogeneous in skill. This result may not
be unique to our setting and heterogeneous compensating differentials may be common for other
non-wage amenities and in other parts of the labor market.
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Table 2.1: Lawyer summary statistics by sector, After the JD
Private Gov Nonprofit Overall
Annual Wage $94,745 $52,400 $44,056 $84,977
(40,992) (15,295) (14,343) (41,263)
Weekly Hours 48.1 41.8 40.5 46.6
(9.1) (6.0) (6.4) (9.0)
Hourly Wage $40.5 $25.3 $21.8 $37.0
(22.2) (7.0) (6.3) (21.0)
Debt $64,728 $62,576 $66,974 $64,501
(40,305) (38,319) (41,097) (40,008)
Law School Ranking, % from tier:
Top 10 10.0 4.2 10.2 9.0
Top 11-20 12.8 6.5 18.8 12.1
Top 21-100 48.0 56.3 36.7 48.7
Tier 3 16.9 16.9 19.5 17.1
Tier 4 12.4 16.1 14.8 13.1
Law School Performance, % with GPA:
3.75 - 4.00 8.3 3.9 5.5 7.4
3.50 - 3.74 20.2 14.6 13.3 18.9
3.25 - 3.49 27.4 22.7 26.6 26.6
3.00 - 3.24 28.1 28.6 24.2 28.0
2.75 - 2.99 11.3 19.5 22.7 13.3
2.50 - 2.74 3.7 8.6 7.8 4.7
2.25 - 2.49 1.0 2.1 0.0 1.1
% Female 41.8 47.1 75.8 44.5
% Male 58.2 52.9 24.2 55.5
General Law Review
Yes % 24.4 12.8 14.1 21.9
No % 71.9 82.3 80.5 74.1
Missing % 3.7 4.9 5.5 4.0
Specialty Law Review
Yes % 26.0 22.4 26.6 25.4
No % 69.6 73.7 71.1 70.3
Missing % 4.5 3.9 2.3 4.3
Observations 1,826 384 128 2,338
This table uses data from the After the JD (AJD) representative survey of
new lawyers in 2002-2003. Law school rankings are from the U.S. News
and World Report in 2003. Schools in tiers 3 and 4 are not ordered within
tier. Standard deviations in parentheses. Dollar figures are in 2002 dollars.
See Appendix B1.1 for further details on this sample.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics by sector, University of Michigan Law School
Private Gov Nonprofit Overall
GPA 1st Year 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
(0.9) (1.2) (0.9) (0.9)
GPA Final 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1
(0.9) (1.1) (0.9) (0.9)
Annual Wage $137,929 $75,259 $56,791 $123,568
(80,023) (30,311) (29,038) (78,156)
Hourly Wage $53.5 $31.8 $24.2 $48.5
(27.2) (11.2) (12.4) (26.9)
Weekly Hours 53.4 48.8 49.4 52.5
(10.0) (9.5) (9.1) (10.0)
Weeks Per Year 48.8 49.0 48.8 48.8
(4.0) (3.4) (3.5) (3.9)
Debt $66,470 $60,266 $58,253 $65,046
(44,725) (46,138) (42,330) (44,735)
% Female 40.5 45.2 60.6 42.8
% Male 59.5 54.8 39.4 57.2
Law Journal %
No 46.5 43.7 43.1 45.9
Yes 53.5 56.3 56.9 54.1
Observations 939 132 103 1,174
This table uses data from the University of Michigan Law School
(UMLS) survey of its graduates, specifically, the 1996-2001 classes,
5 years after graduation, restricted to full-time workers (1000+
hours/year). GPAs are in standard deviation units around the popula-
tion mean and come from administrative data. They do not average
to 0 because higher GPA students respond more often. Dollar figures
are in 2002 dollars. See Appendix B1.2 for further details on this
sample.
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Table 2.3: Sectoral choice probit marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3)
Rank 1-10 −0.030 (0.032) −0.028 (0.029) −0.010 (0.028)
Rank 11-20 −0.029 (0.028) −0.019 (0.023) −0.004 (0.022)
Rank 21-100 0.018 (0.018) 0.015 (0.016) 0.020 (0.015)
Tier 3 0.012 (0.020) 0.002 (0.019) −0.002 (0.019)
GPA 4.00-3.75 0.077 (0.046) 0.049 (0.037) 0.037 (0.036)
GPA 3.74-3.50 0.079 (0.043) 0.033 (0.036) 0.028 (0.035)
GPA 3.49-3.25 0.065 (0.043) 0.034 (0.035) 0.023 (0.034)
GPA 3.24-3.00 0.082∗ (0.041) 0.052 (0.034) 0.044 (0.033)
GPA 2.99-2.75 0.013 (0.046) 0.004 (0.038) 0.003 (0.035)
Law Review General 0.025 (0.013) 0.016 (0.012) 0.011 (0.012)
Law Review Special 0.009 (0.015) 0.005 (0.014) 0.003 (0.014)
Male 0.072∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.038∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.031∗∗ (0.010)
Soc. Resp. Pref. 2 0.007 (0.013) −0.014 (0.017)
Soc. Resp. Pref. 3 0.014 (0.012) 0.001 (0.011)
Soc. Resp. Pref. 4 0.002 (0.015) −0.024 (0.022)
Soc. Resp. Pref. 5 −0.031 (0.023) −0.088 (0.046)
Soc. Resp. Pref. 6 −0.109∗∗∗ (0.032) −0.164∗∗ (0.058)
Soc. Resp. Pref. 7 −0.371∗∗∗ (0.047) −0.342∗∗∗ (0.069)
Earn. Pot. Pref. 2 0.107∗ (0.050)
Earn. Pot. Pref. 3 0.143∗∗ (0.050)
Earn. Pot. Pref. 4 0.116∗ (0.050)
Earn. Pot. Pref. 5 0.146∗∗ (0.049)
Earn. Pot. Pref. 6 0.179∗∗∗ (0.050)
Earn. Pot. Pref. 7 0.177∗∗∗ (0.051)
Pseudo-R2 0.110 0.307 0.373
N 1936 1936 1936
This table uses data from the 2002-2003 AJD survey of new lawyers. Private Sector=1, Non-
profit sector=0. Column 3 is our preferred specification. The preferences question in the AJD
2002-2003 survey are a set of questions of the form: “Thinking about the principal types of
settings in which lawyers work (e.g., government, large law firms, business), how important
was each of the following factors in determining the sector in which you began your profes-
sional career?” Answers range from 1=“Not At All Important” to 7=“Extremely Important”.
The prompts used in this table are worded, “Opportunity to do socially responsible work” and
“Medium-to-long-term earning potential”. Estimated effects are averaged over the sample and
are relative to the omitted group for categorical variables. The omitted groups are: Tier 4
law school ranking, GPA 2.74-2.50, and responses of 1 for the preference questions. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.4: Work preferences by sector (AJD 2002)
Private Gov Nonprofit All
Earnings potential 5.39 3.58 2.88 4.90
(1.71) (1.87) (1.96) (1.96)
Substantive interest 5.16 5.47 5.88 5.27
(1.73) (1.85) (1.49) (1.75)
Pay off debts 5.28 3.70 3.42 4.87
(2.05) (2.10) (2.02) (2.18)
Loan repayment assistance 1.89 2.66 3.65 2.16
(1.62) (2.05) (2.49) (1.85)
Develop specific skills 5.33 5.73 5.62 5.42
(1.57) (1.54) (1.53) (1.57)
Work-life balance 5.05 5.81 6.19 5.27
(1.77) (1.58) (1.27) (1.75)
Socially responsible 3.52 5.59 6.19 4.08
(1.84) (1.77) (1.46) (2.05)
Prestige 4.21 4.40 2.72 4.14
(1.96) (1.95) (1.80) (1.99)
Future career mobility 5.31 5.11 4.38 5.21
(1.70) (1.76) (1.99) (1.74)
N 1,106 264 99 1,469
The preferences question in the AJD 2002-2003 survey are a set of ques-
tions of the form: “Thinking about the principal types of settings in
which lawyers work (e.g., government, large law firms, business), how
important was each of the following factors in determining the sector
in which you began your professional career?” Answers range from
1=“Not At All Important” to 7=“Extremely Important”. Standard devia-
tions are in parentheses.
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Table 2.5: Work preferences by law school rank
1-10 11-20 21-100 Tier 3 Tier 4 All
Earnings potential 4.86 5.22 5.29 5.03 5.27 5.19
(1.91) (1.93) (1.82) (1.93) (1.78) (1.86)
Socially responsible 3.60 3.66 3.75 3.64 4.15 3.75
(1.83) (1.98) (1.94) (2.03) (2.00) (1.96)
N 125 174 551 204 146 1,200
The preferences question in the AJD 2002 survey are a set of questions of the
form: “Thinking about the principal types of settings in which lawyers work
(e.g., government, large law firms, business), how important was each of the fol-
lowing factors in determining the sector in which you began your professional
career?” Answers range from 1=“Not At All Important” to 7=“Extremely Im-
portant”. These two prompts are worded, “Medium-to-long-term earning poten-
tial” and “Opportunity to do socially responsible work”. This table uses a pooled
sample of private and non-profit lawyers. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: AJD Private Sector Log Hourly Wage Regressions
Xi Xi, Zi = Social Xi, Zi = Social, Earnings
Rank 1-10 0.545∗∗∗ (0.0498) 0.524∗∗∗ (0.0494) 0.532∗∗∗ (0.0489)
Rank 11-20 0.411∗∗∗ (0.0484) 0.395∗∗∗ (0.0478) 0.390∗∗∗ (0.0479)
Rank 21-100 0.213∗∗∗ (0.0403) 0.200∗∗∗ (0.0401) 0.197∗∗∗ (0.0400)
Tier 3 0.0795∗ (0.0400) 0.0650 (0.0402) 0.0701 (0.0401)
GPA 4.00-3.75 0.501∗∗∗ (0.137) 0.463∗∗∗ (0.134) 0.458∗∗∗ (0.128)
GPA 3.74-3.50 0.495∗∗∗ (0.134) 0.453∗∗∗ (0.131) 0.444∗∗∗ (0.124)
GPA 3.49-3.25 0.400∗∗ (0.133) 0.369∗∗ (0.130) 0.361∗∗ (0.123)
GPA 3.24-3.00 0.284∗ (0.132) 0.256∗ (0.129) 0.249∗ (0.123)
GPA 2.99-2.75 0.177 (0.133) 0.165 (0.130) 0.178 (0.124)
GPA 2.74-2.50 0.201 (0.139) 0.178 (0.136) 0.193 (0.130)
Law Rev Gen 0.157∗∗∗ (0.0257) 0.157∗∗∗ (0.0253) 0.148∗∗∗ (0.0250)
Law Rev Spec 0.0799∗∗ (0.0262) 0.0931∗∗∗(0.0258) 0.0927∗∗∗ (0.0256)
Male 0.0486∗ (0.0208) 0.0346 (0.0208) 0.0285 (0.0206)
Soc. Resp. Pref. 2 0.0861 (0.0502) 0.0655 (0.0500)
Soc. Resp. Pref. 3 0.0490 (0.0453) 0.0369 (0.0455)
Soc. Resp. Pref. 4 0.0289 (0.0452) 0.00210 (0.0458)
Soc. Resp. Pref. 5 −0.0665 (0.0475) −0.0838 (0.0474)
Soc. Resp. Pref. 6 −0.00939 (0.0540) −0.0213 (0.0545)
Soc. Resp. Pref. 7 −0.209∗ (0.0817) −0.225∗∗ (0.0781)
Earn. Pot. Pref. 2 0.119 (0.0848)
Earn. Pot. Pref. 3 0.138 (0.0870)
Earn. Pot. Pref. 4 0.132 (0.0788)
Earn. Pot. Pref. 5 0.182∗ (0.0738)
Earn. Pot. Pref. 6 0.188∗ (0.0733)
Earn. Pot. Pref. 7 0.287∗∗∗ (0.0733)
Constant 2.967∗∗∗ (0.137) 3.007∗∗∗ (0.139) 2.841∗∗∗ (0.150)
r2 0.335 0.356 0.372
N 1826 1826 1826
The preferences question in the AJD 2002-2003 survey are a set of questions of the form: “Thinking about the principal
types of settings in which lawyers work (e.g., government, large law firms, business), how important was each of the
following factors in determining the sector in which you began your professional career?” Answers range from 1=“Not
At All Important” to 7=“Extremely Important”. The prompts used in this table are worded, “Opportunity to do socially
responsible work” and “Medium-to-long-term earning potential”. The omitted groups are: Tier 4 law school ranking,
GPA 2.49-2.25, and responses of 1 for the preference questions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.7: AJD Nonprofit Sector Log Hourly Wage Regressions
Xi
Rank 1-10 −0.00802 (0.150)
Rank 11-20 0.0598 (0.0868)
Rank 21-100 0.0284 (0.0778)
Tier 3 0.172∗ (0.0787)
GPA 4.00-3.75 0.169 (0.158)
GPA 3.74-3.50 0.229 (0.143)
GPA 3.49-3.25 0.0770 (0.0871)
GPA 3.24-3.00 0.0595 (0.0854)
GPA 2.99-2.75−0.00354 (0.0847)
Law Rev Gen 0.131 (0.120)
Law Rev Spec 0.0272 (0.0724)
Male 0.104 (0.0567)
Constant 2.589∗∗∗ (0.157)
r2 0.259
N 128
Standard errors are in parentheses.
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
67
Table 2.8: UMLS log hourly wage regressions by sector
Private Private Nonprofit Nonprofit
5 years 15 years 5 years 15 years
First year GPA 0.113∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.0486 0.0882
(0.0151) (0.0224) (0.0368) (0.0521)
Law Journal 0.0979∗∗∗ 0.0780 0.121 0.00583
(0.0289) (0.0475) (0.0696) (0.120)
Male 0.0126 0.110∗ 0.0171 −0.00753
(0.0285) (0.0455) (0.0720) (0.0992)
Class years after 1991 0.0632∗∗∗ −0.00376
(0.00621) (0.0145)
Class years after 1981 0.0138∗ 0.0214
(0.00659) (0.0159)
Constant 3.424∗∗∗ 4.205∗∗∗ 3.011∗∗∗ 3.501∗∗∗
(0.0320) (0.0503) (0.0720) (0.109)
r2 0.148 0.0804 0.0673 0.0491
N 1168 1015 109 116
The 5 year estimates use class years 1991-2000 and the 15 year estimates use class years 1981-1990. We restrict to
full-time workers (1000+ hours/year). GPAs are in standard deviation units around the population mean and come
from administrative data. Dollar figures are in 2002 dollars. Standard errors are in parentheses.
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.9: Estimated average opportunity cost of working in the nonprofit sector
Model
AJD 0.453∗∗∗
(0.038)
UMLS 5 years after law school 0.640∗∗∗
(0.039)
UMLS 15 years after law school 0.779∗∗∗
(0.054)
The 5 and 15 year UMLS estimates use class years 1991-2000 and 1981-1990, respectively. Standard errors in paren-
theses. Standard errors are bootstrapped, using 200 repetitions.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.10: Estimated average opportunity cost of working in the nonprofit sector by law school
rank
Law school rank
All 0.453∗∗∗
(0.033)
1-10 1.060∗∗∗
(0.084)
11-20 0.737∗∗∗
(0.065)
21-100 0.397∗∗∗
(0.048)
Tier 3 0.161∗
(0.067)
Tier 4 0.202∗∗∗
(0.060)
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are bootstrapped, using 200 repetitions. Estimates are in log hourly
wages.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.11: Sensitivity of estimated average opportunity cost of working in the nonprofit sector to
unobservables
ρ AJD UMLS
-0.5 0.841∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.049)
-0.4 0.760∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.044)
-0.3 0.682∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.041)
-0.2 0.605∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.038)
-0.1 0.528∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.038)
0 0.453∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.039)
0.1 0.377∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.042)
0.2 0.301∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.046)
0.3 0.225∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.052)
0.4 0.147∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.060)
0.5 0.067 0.168∗
(0.037) (0.069)
The UMLS column is based on the 5-year estimates as shown in Table 2.9. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors are bootstrapped, using 200 repetitions. Estimates are in log hourly wages. ρ represent the correlation between
the sector selection and wage equations.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.12: Sector Switchers from AJD
2002/2007 sector Nonprof/Nonprof Nonprof/Priv Priv/Priv Priv/Nonprof
Log hourly wage 2002 3.02 3.12 3.59 3.48
(0.28) (0.31) (0.45) (0.68)
Log hourly wage 2007 3.25 3.92 3.98 3.53
(0.30) (0.77) (0.55) (0.40)
Social Resp. Preference 6.31 5.71 3.41 3.69
(1.31) (1.65) (1.78) (2.24)
Earning Potential Preference 2.38 3.76 5.45 5.07
(1.70) (2.05) (1.70) (1.87)
Observations 32 17 551 29
This table uses data from the 2002-2003 and 2007-2008 AJD surveys of new lawyers. Wages are in
2002 dollars. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 2.13: AJD switchers: log hourly wage regression
Sector in Wave 1
Nonprofit Private
(1) (2)
Switched Sector 0.567∗∗∗ −0.340∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.088)
Sector Switchers 17 29
Observations 98 1,160
R2 0.792 0.819
Notes: This table uses panel data from Waves 1 and 2 of AJD. It includes individual and wave fixed
effects. Each observation is a log hourly wage of an individual in either Wave 1 (about 2 years after
law school) or Wave 2 (about 7 years after law school). Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
73
Table 2.14: Sector Switchers from UMLS
A. Wages and GPA by Sector at Years 1 and 5 After Law School (UMLS Class Years 1991-2000)
Year1/Year4 sector Nonprof/Nonprof Nonprof/Priv Priv/Priv Priv/Nonprof
Log annual wage (year 1) 10.43 10.34 11.17 10.94
(0.28) (0.39) (0.40) (0.64)
Log annual wage (year 4) 10.64 10.83 11.58 10.81
(0.50) (0.57) (0.49) (0.53)
GPA 1st Year 0.04 -0.70 0.20 0.16
(0.85) (1.03) (0.90) (0.93)
GPA Final 0.13 -0.72 0.20 0.13
(0.83) (0.97) (0.88) (0.81)
Observations 42 19 1124 56
B. Wages and GPA by Sector at Years 1 and 15 After Law School (UMLS Class Years 1981-1990)
Year1/Year14 sector Nonprof/Nonprof Nonprof/Priv Priv/Priv Priv/Nonprof
Log annual wage (year 1) 10.46 10.25 11.13 11.00
(0.27) (0.93) (0.33) (0.41)
Log annual wage (year 14) 10.95 11.42 12.15 11.27
(0.49) (0.69) (0.75) (0.83)
GPA 1st Year -0.36 -0.67 0.18 0.42
(0.86) (0.91) (0.89) (1.11)
GPA Final -0.37 -0.59 0.19 0.46
(1.03) (0.94) (0.88) (1.13)
Observations 18 14 853 73
This Table shows wages and GPAs by sector switchers grouping from the University of Michigan Law
School. Panel A shows switchers from their first year to their fourth year after law school. Panel B shows
switchers from their first year to their fourteenth year after law school. Wages are in 2002 dollars. GPAs
are in standard deviation units around the population mean and come from administrative data. They do not
average to 0 because higher GPA students respond more often. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 2.15: UMLS switchers: log annual wage regressions
Sector in year 1
Nonprofit Private Nonprofit Private
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Switched Sector 0.278 −0.537∗∗∗ 0.684∗ −0.748∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.071) (0.301) (0.091)
Sector Switchers 19 56 14 73
Initial Earnings Year 1 1 1 1
Later Earnings Year 5 5 15 15
Class Years 1991-2000 1991-2000 1981-1990 1981-1990
Observations 122 2,360 64 1,852
R2 0.648 0.734 0.693 0.769
Notes: This table uses panel data from UMLS. It includes individual and survey year fixed effects.
Each observation is a log annual wage of an individual in either the first and fifth years after law
school (columns 1 and 2) or the first and fifteenth year after law school (columns 3 and 4). We
use annual rather than hourly wages since hours of work are not available in the first year after law
school. Columns 1 and 2 use class years 1991-2000 and columns 3 and 4 use class years 1981-
1990. Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.16: Sector Plan Switchers from the UMLS
Entering/Leaving Plans Nonprof/Nonprof Nonprof/Priv Priv/Priv Priv/Nonprof All
Annual Wage (year 1) $51,017 $74,715 $71,777 $48,053 $68,849
(31,306) (22,066) (20,901) (20,449) (23,869)
Annual Wage (year 4) $70,056 $83,452 $96,345 $74,696 $91,126
(56,933) (33,727) (35,552) (33,445) (39,791)
Annual Wage (year 14) $159,204 $133,392 $244,586 $152,577 $219,978
(258,548) (120,726) (258,428) (130,053) (248,751)
Year 1 GPA 0.30 -0.04 0.16 0.21 0.16
(1.10) (0.82) (0.90) (1.23) (0.93)
Final GPA 0.42 0.02 0.17 0.21 0.19
(1.04) (0.80) (0.89) (1.23) (0.92)
Observations 86 69 499 16 670
This Table shows wages and GPAs by planned long-term career sector plan switchers grouping, when entering
and leaving law school, for University of Michigan Law School, class years 1992-1991. Wages are in 2002
dollars. GPAs are in standard deviation units around the population mean and come from administrative
data. They do not average to 0 because higher GPA students respond more often. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
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Table 2.17: Debt by Law School Rank
1-10 11-20 21-100 Tier 3 Tier 4 All
Debt $73,848 $63,291 $60,614 $68,078 $71,062 $64,874
(48,921) (38,562) (39,354) (40,762) (35,272) (40,350)
Observations 194 250 904 326 236 1,910
This table uses data from the 2002-2003 AJD survey of new lawyers. Standard devia-
tions in parentheses. Dollar figures are in 2002 dollars.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Private Sector Annual Compensation by Law School Rank in the Private
and Nonprofit Sectors
This figure uses data from the AJD survey of new lawyers in 2002-2003.
78
Figure 2.2: Preferences and Sector Choice
This figure uses data from the AJD survey of new lawyers in 2002-2003.
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Figure 2.3: Preferences and Skill
This figure uses data from the AJD survey of new lawyers in 2002-2003.
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Figure 2.4: Conceptual Diagram of Sorting by Skill and Preferences
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Figure 2.5: Lawyer Pay, GPA and Sectoral Sorting Over Time
This figure uses data from the University of Michigan Law School Survey. Annual salary is in 2002 dollars.
GPA’s are within year standard deviations away from the mean.
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B1 Detailed Data Description
B1.1 After the JD
Survey Design and Response Rates
We use waves 1 and 2 of the restricted version of the After the JD (AJD) panel sample of lawyers
who first passed the bar in 2000 and graduated from law school between 1998 and 2000. 95% of
respondents graduated in 2000. AJD waves 1 and 2 were conducted in 2002-2003 and 2007-2008
respectively by the American Bar Foundation (ABF), with a response rate of 71% in wave 1 and
51% in wave 2. Wave 1 had 4,538 respondents who met the above sampling criteria, while wave 2
had 3,704, with a total of 5,353 lawyers who responded to at least one wave.
This response rate is for sample members who the survey administrators located and who met
the criteria for the study. In wave 1, the total response rate of all lawyers in the entire sample,
including those later not located or who did not meet the sample’s criteria was 50%. About 20%
could not be located. By wave 2, members who did not meet the sampling criteria were excluded
and ABF located and surveyed 98% of the entire sample of eligible respondents, including those
that did not reply during wave 1. 27% of repondents in wave 2 did not take the survey in wave 1.
Not all respondents answered each question.
The survey is nationally representative with a stratified sample design based on surveying 18
legal markets, including the largest four (New York City, the District of Columbia, Chicago and
Los Angeles), as well as 14 other areas consisting of smaller metropolitan areas or entire states.
We use the AJD sampling weights in all regressions.
Sample Restrictions
In all of our empirical results, we restrict our sample of the 5,353 individuals who responded to at
least one of the two waves to 2,338 individuals as follows. We drop individuals in the following
groups: lowest GPA category, did not take graded courses, did not report a GPA, law degree is from
outside the US, law degree is from an unaccredited school, annual wage is greater than $250,000,
did not report an annual wage, did not report weekly work hours, reported “other” as their work
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sector, did not report their work sector and age over 40. Further restricting our sample to only
private or nonprofit lawyers (removing government lawyers) reduces our sample to 1,954. Some
tables in our analysis have smaller sample sizes because they rely on additional survey questions
which not all respondents answered.
We restrict the sample to include respondents who completed key questions (including GPA).
However, there is still some nonresponse to some of our other controls. Because all of our control
variables are categorical, for each question we create an additional category of nonrespondents.
Thus, the regressions capture the conditional expectation in the population that answered the ques-
tion.
Variable Construction
The key variables are the sector in which the lawyer is employed and annual income. We also
describe all of the controls for skill that are used in the regressions. The preference variables are
described in detail in the paper.
Sector: We use a question about the type of organization in which the lawyer works to group
lawyers into sectors. The question asks, “What type of organization is [your current primary
employer]?” AJD provides respondents with 13 choices. Table B1 shows how we group the 13
possible responses into our 3 sectors, private, government and nonprofit.
Income and Hours: Our measure of income is pre-tax income including bonuses. We use
responses to the following question: “What is your total annual salary (before taxes) including
estimated bonus, if applicable, at your current job?” For our measure of hours we use a measure of
“typical” hours: “How many hours are you expected to work during a typical week at your job?”
This question is distinct from the number of billable hours in a week.
Constructing Hourly Wage: Data on number of weeks worked per year is not available. We
construct an hourly wage variable assuming that lawyers in all sectors worked 50 weeks a year. We
chose 50 because it is both the mode and mean of responses to the UMLS survey question about
weeks worked per year, for lawyers in class years 1996-2001 who worked at least 40 hours per
week. One concern with this procedure is if hours and hourly wage are positively correlated, then
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we might not be accounting for the bundling of hours and salary and as a result we would be over-
stating the compensation of private sector lawyers because they consume less leisure. However,
hours and hourly wage are weakly negatively correlated; with a correlation coefficient of−.20. We
report all wages in real (2002) dollars.
Educational Background: All regressions in the paper include the following variables about
law school:
• Categorical variables for law school GPA in 0.25 GPA unit bins;
• Law school tier;
• Whether on a specialty law review;
• Whether on a general law review;
We also include the following variables about a lawyer’s undergraduate education:
• Whether attended a public or a private school;
• Undergraduate GPA in 0.25 unit bins;
• Whether graduated in the top 10% of the undergraduate class;
• Whether majored in science as an undergraduate.
Demographics We include an indicator variable for gender, and a categorical variable for
race/ethnicity.
A Note on Variables in Regressions Using AJD Data
Our wage and sector regressions, for conciseness, all include unreported coefficients on the above
undergraduate variables, and on indicators for missing values for all categorical variables, where
applicable.
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B1.2 University of Michigan Law School Survey
Survey Design and Response Rates
The University of Michigan Law School (UMLS) panel dataset contains survey responses from
UMLS students who graduated between the years of 1952-2001. The law school conducted surveys
each year and surveyed lawyers as often as 5, 15, 25, 35 and 45 years after graduation, although not
all class years were surveyed at each of these milestones, a limitation which restricts our analysis
in some cases. Table B2 shows the years in which the survey was conducted after graduation,
by class year. The most recent survey year available to us is 2006. Most of the questions did
not change substantially over the years and respondents were asked both about the present day
and their time in law school. The dataset contains a total of 16,921 individuals (including non-
respondents), and 34,828 unique opportunities to respond, with a response rate of about 66% each
year. We typically pool responses across 5 or more years in our analysis, because there are only
around 200 respondents per class year and only a small fraction of them are in the nonprofit sector.
Variable Construction
Sectoral Plans:
We use the following variables:
• v0110: employment plans when entering law school;
• v0111: employment plans when leaving law school;
Sector:
We use the following questions to code sector:
• v0444, v1429, v2429: sector 1, 5 and 15 years after graduation, respectively.
Each question has a slightly different set of responses. UMLS does not use the same sectoral
categories as AJD, or across relevant questions. For post-law school employment questions, we
consider responses of “Legal service” and “Public interest” to be the nonprofit sector, while for
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questions about plans during law school we count the “Legal Services” and “Teacher” categories
as nonprofit, noting that “Public interest” is not one of the categories in this case.
For v0444:
• Private: Private firm or business;
• Government: Government;
• Nonprofit: legal service or public interest.
For v1429 and v2429:
• Private: Private firm; Fortune 500; Other business; banking/finance; accounting firm; insur-
ance.
• Government: Federal government; state or local government;
• Nonprofit: legal service; public interest; education.
Income and Hours:
We use the following variables for income:
• v1851: income in first year after law school;
• v1852: income in fourth year after law school
• v2853: income in fourteenth year after law school
• v3854: income in twenty four years after law school
• v4855: income in thirty four years after law school
We report all wages in real (2002) dollars. To construct the present discounted value of lifetime
earnings we smooth between these reports and discount annual earnings at a 0.95 rate.
We use the following variables for hours and weeks:
• v1479 and v2479: hours worked per week five and fifteen years after law school;
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• v1480 and v2480: weeks worked per year five and fifteen years after law school.
Educational Background:
We include the following variables:
• v0871: first year GPA in standard deviation units;
• v0872: final GPA in standard deviation units;
• v0143: law journal (any)
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Table B1: Construction of the Sector Variable (AJD 2002)
Detailed Sector Number Sector Number
Solo Practice 61 Private 1,826
Private Law firm 1,653
Prof Serv Firm 24
Other Fortune 1000 35
Other business/indus 53
Fed (including clerk) 115 Gov 384
State/Local (including clerk) 269
Legal Service/Public Defender 78 Nonprofit 128
public interest 28
other nonprofit 13
educational instit 7
labor trade union 2
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Table B2: UMLS Survey Years
Years After Graduation
Class Year 5 15 25 35 45
1952-1961 no yes no no yes
1962-1967 no yes no yes no
1968-1971 yes yes no yes no
1972-1981 yes yes yes no no
1982-1991 yes yes no no no
1992-2001 yes no no no no
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Table B3: Law School Financial Support Percentages by Sector
Private Gov Nonprofit
employment 14.1 14.1 9.8
federal loans 40.3 43.7 48.1
private loans 6.3 7.1 7.3
other loans 5.2 4.8 4.6
school based grants 8.1 7.8 7.8
other grants 0.6 0.4 0.0
spouse/partner 4.5 3.3 6.8
parent or relative 17.7 14.6 11.4
previous savings 2.7 3.8 4.0
veterans benefits 0.5 0.8 0.2
other 3.7 1.2 5.6
Observations 291 83 36
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Table B4: Parents’ Education by Sector, AJD
sector
pr
iv
at
e
go
v
no
np
ro
fit
To
ta
l
% % % %
father’s education
grade school 3.4 1.2 6.5 3.2
some high school 2.5 2.4 3.3 2.5
high school diploma or equivalent 15.4 16.3 10.6 15.2
trade or vocational school 4.4 3.6 5.7 4.4
associate or two-year degree 10.8 12.5 16.3 11.5
bachelors or four-year degree 20.3 16.6 20.3 19.6
law degree (j.d.) 8.7 10.1 8.1 9.0
some graduate or professional school 4.4 3.3 1.6 4.0
graduate or professional degree 30.1 34.1 27.6 30.7
mother’s education
grade school 2.9 1.5 4.8 2.8
some high school 3.0 1.8 2.4 2.7
high school diploma or equivalent 21.6 18.5 22.4 21.1
trade or vocational school 4.6 5.7 6.4 4.9
associate or two-year degree 16.7 19.9 15.2 17.2
bachelors or four-year degree 25.0 25.6 20.0 24.8
law degree (j.d.) 1.5 1.5 0.8 1.5
some graduate or professional school 4.8 3.9 3.2 4.5
graduate or professional degree 19.9 21.7 24.8 20.6
N 1,320 336 125 1,781
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CHAPTER 3
Recruitment of Foreigners in the Market for
Computer Scientists in the US
3.1 Introduction
An increasingly high proportion of the scientists and engineers in the US were born abroad. At
a very general level, the issues that come up in the discussion of high skilled immigration mirror
the discussion of low skilled immigration. The most basic economic arguments suggest that both
high-skill and low-skill immigrants: (1) impart benefits to employers, to owners of other inputs
used in production such as capital, and to consumers, and (2) potentially, impose some costs on
workers who are close substitutes (Borjas (1999)). On the other hand, the magnitude of these costs
may be substantially mitigated if US high skilled workers have good alternatives to working in
sectors most impacted by immigrants (Peri and Sparber (2011), Peri et al. (2013)). Additionally,
unlike low skilled immigrants, high skilled immigrants contribute to the generation of knowledge
and productivity through patenting and innovation. Doing so both serves to shift out the production
possibility frontier in the US and may also slow the erosion of the US comparative advantage in
high tech (Freeman (2006); Krugman (1979)).
In this paper we study the impact of high skilled immigration on the labor market for computer
scientists (CS) in the US, during the Internet boom of the 1990s, and the subsequent slump in the
early 2000s. During this period, we observe a substantial increase in the number of temporary
non-immigrant visas awarded to high skilled workers, and individuals with computer-related oc-
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cupations becoming the largest share of H-1B visa holders (US General Accounting Office, 2000).
Given these circumstances, it is of considerable interest to investigate how the influx of foreigners
affected the labor market outcomes for US computer scientists during this period.
In order to evaluate the impact of immigration on CS domestic workers, we construct a dynamic
model that characterizes the labor supply and demand for CS workers during this period. We
build into the model the key assumption that labor demand shocks, such as the one created by
the dissemination of the Internet, can be accommodated by three sources of CS workers: recent
college graduates with CS degrees, US residents in different occupations who switch to CS jobs,
and skilled foreigners. Furthermore, firms face a trade-off when deciding to employ immigrants:
foreigners are potentially either more productive or less costly than US workers, but there are extra
recruitment costs associated with hiring them.
The approach we take in this paper is distinctly partial equilibrium in nature – we focus on the
market for computer scientists and ignore any wider impacts that high skilled immigration might
have on the U.S. economy (Nathan (2013)). While we believe this approach can potentially be
used to understand the impact that the availability of high skilled foreign labor might have had
for this market, this approach precludes any analysis of the overall welfare impact of the H-1B
program in particular or high skilled immigration more generally.
The predictions of the model on the impacts of immigration on wages depend on the elasticity
of labor demand for computer scientists. As long as the demand curve slopes downwards, the
increased availability of foreign computer scientists will put downward pressure on the wages for
computer scientists in the US. However, as we discuss further in Section 4.4, there are a number
of considerations that might lead us to think otherwise in the case of computer scientists. First,
even in a closed economy, the fact that computer scientists contribute to innovation reduces the
negative effects foreign computer scientists might have on the labor market opportunities for skilled
domestic workers. In addition, in an increasingly global world, we might expect that restrictions
on the hiring of foreign skilled workers in the US would lead employers to increase the extent
to which they outsource work. Indeed, if computer scientists are a sufficient spur to innovation,
or if it is easy for domestic employers to offshore work, any negative effects that an increase in
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the number of foreign computer scientists working in the US might have on the domestic skilled
workforce would be completely offset by increases in the domestic demand for computer scientists.
In the end this issue comes down to the slope of the demand curve for computer scientists.1
We use data on wages, domestic and foreign employment, and undergraduate degree comple-
tions by major, during the late 1990s and early 2000s to calibrate the parameters of our model such
that it reproduces the stylized facts of the CS market during the period. Next, we use the calibrated
model to simulate counterfactuals on how the economy would behave if firms had a restriction on
the number of foreigners they could hire. Conditional on our assumptions about the slope of the
demand curve for computer scientists, our simulation suggests that had US firms not been able to
increase their employment of foreign computer scientists above its 1994 level, CS wages would be
2.8-3.8% higher in 2004. Furthermore, the number of Americans working in the CS industry would
be 7.0-13.6% higher, the total number of CS workers would be 3.8-9.0% lower and the enrollment
levels in computer science would be 19.9-25.5% higher than the observed levels in 2004.
Within the confines of the model, the predictions of our model do not depend on the specific
choice we made for non-calibrated parameters, with one important exception. The exception:
crowd out in the market for computer scientists depends crucially on the elasticity of demand for
their services. Ideally, we would be able to use exogenous supply shifts to identify the slope of the
demand curve for computer scientists, while we use exogenous shifts in demand to identify supply
curves. We believe that largely exogenous technological breakthroughs in the 1990s increased
the demand for computer scientists, allowing us to identify supply curves.2 In other contexts,
researchers have treated the increase in foreign born workers in the US economy as exogenous.
However, in the current context, immigration law in the US implies that most of the foreign born
and trained individuals who migrate to the US to work as computer scientists do so because they
1In this discussion we are assuming that foreign trained computer scientists are close substitutes for domestically
trained ones. If foreign and domestically trained computer scientists are imperfect substitutes for each other, then the
impact that the increased immigration will have on domestically trained computer scientists will also depend on the
degree of substitutability between computer scientists trained domestically and abroad.
2These include the introduction of the World Wide Web, web browsers, and of search engines. During this time,
Microsoft developed popular user-friendly operating systems, and Linux and other free and open-source software
packages grew to power much of the Internet’s server infrastructure. Sun Microsystems introduced the Java program-
ming language and various service providers made e-mail available to a wider base of consumers. These types of
software innovation, along with steady, rapid improvements to computer hardware and reductions in its cost perma-
nently changed the structure and nature of the industry.
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are sponsored by US based firms. Thus, it seems implausible to treat the number of foreign born
computer scientists in the US as an exogenous increase in supply. In the end, without credible
sources of identifying information, we resort to parametrically varying the elasticity of the demand
for computer scientists through, what we will argue is a plausible range, from -1.3 to -4.0.
This paper constitutes a contribution to two different dimensions of the research literature.
First, our study can be seen as an extension of the models of the market for scientists and engineers
developed by Freeman (1975, 1976) in the 1970s and refined by Ryoo and Rosen (2004a) more
recently. In Ryoo and Rosen’s model, employers are restricted to hiring recent graduates from
US engineering programs. In our model, employers can also hire both foreigners and US based
individuals not trained as computer scientists. As a result, the supply of CS workers implied by
our model is substantially more elastic than implied by the Ryoo and Rosen model, especially in
the short term. More importantly, the substantial number of skilled foreign workers affects how
the labor and education markets adjusts to an increase in the demand for skilled labor. Second,
our paper relates to the recent literature on the potential impact that the hiring of high skilled
immigrants might have on the wages and employment prospects of US natives.
We review this literature in detail, and describe the market for CS workers in section 2. Section
3 presents the dynamic model we build to characterize the market for CS workers when firms can
recruit foreigners. In section 4, we describe how we calibrate the parameters of the model and the
counterfactual simulations where firms have restrictions on the number of foreigners they can hire.
We conclude with section 5 which presents a discussion based on the results of the paper.
3.2 The Market for Computer Scientists in the 1990s
3.2.1 The Information Technology Boom of the Late 1990s
During the mid 1990s, we observe the beginning of the utilization of the Internet for commercial
purposes in the United States3 and a substantial increase in the number of Internet users. One
3The decommissioning of the National Science Foundation Network in April of 1995 is considered the milestone
for introducing nationwide commercial traffic on the Internet. (Leiner et al. (1997)).
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indicator of a contemporaneous change in demand for IT workers is the rise of R&D expenditure
of firms in both the computer programming services, and the computer related equipment sector.
Specifically, the share of total private R&D of the firms of these two industries increased from
19.5% to 22.1% between 1991 and 1998 (author’s computations using Compustat data). The entry
and then extraordinary appreciation of tech firms like Yahoo, Amazon and eBay provides a further
testament to the “boom” in the IT sector prior to 2001.
These technological innovations had a dramatic effect on the labor market for computer scien-
tists. According to the Census, the number of employed individuals working either as computer
scientists or computer software developers (CS) increased by 161% between the years 1990 and
2000. As a comparison, during the same period, the total number of employed workers with at
least a bachelor degree increased by 27%, while the number of workers in other STEM occupa-
tions increased by 14%.4 Table 3.1 shows computer scientists as a share of the college educated
workforce and the college educated STEM workforce. In each case, the share was rising before
1990, but rises dramatically during the 1990s. Indeed, by 2000 more than half of all STEM work-
ers are computer scientists. In Figure 3.1a, we use the CPS to show a similar pattern, additionally
showing that the growth of CS employment started in the second half of the decade - the same
period as the dissemination of the Internet. There is no doubt this was a period of employment
expansion of the CS workforce.
On top of employment decisions, there is evidence that Internet innovation also affected edu-
cational choices of students. We show in Figure 3.1b that the number of bachelor degrees awarded
in computer science as a fraction of both the total number of bachelor degrees and the number of
STEM major degrees increased dramatically during this period. The CS share of total bachelor
degrees increased from about 2% in 1995 to more than 4% in 2002. Even when compared to other
STEM majors, it is clear from the figure that for college students, the decision to study computer
science also responded to the Internet boom.
In addition to affecting employment and enrollment decisions, there is also empirical evidence
4Here and elsewhere our tabulations restrict the analysis to workers with at least a bachelor degree and use the
IPUMS suggested occupational crosswalk. Other STEM occupations are defined as engineers, mathematical and
natural scientists.
97
that computer scientist wages responded to expanding Internet use. From the Census, we observe
a 18% increase in the median real weekly wages of CS workers between 1990 and 2000. The
CPS presents similar patterns: starting in the year 1994 we observe in Figure 3.1c that wages
of computer scientists increased considerably when compared to both workers with other STEM
occupations and all workers with a bachelor degree. In fact, while during the beginning of the
1990s, the earnings of CS workers were systematically lower than other STEM occupations, the
wage differential tends to disappear after 1998.5
3.2.2 The Immigrant Contribution to the Growth of the High Tech Work-
force
Employment adjustments in the market for computer scientists happened disproportionately
among foreigners during the Internet boom. Evidence for this claim is found in Table 3.1 and
Figure 3.1d, where we use the Census and CPS to compare the share of foreign computer scientists
to the share of foreign workers in other occupations.6 In the second half of 1990s, the foreign
fraction of CS workers increased considerably more than both the foreign fraction of all workers
with a bachelor degree and the foreign fraction of all workers in a STEM occupation. In particular,
foreigners were less represented among individuals working as computer scientists than in other
STEM occupations in 1994. However, with the dissemination of the Internet in the later years
of the decade, foreigners became a more important part of the pool of CS workers, as foreigners
comprised 29.6% of the increase in CS workers.
The growth in the representation of the foreign born among the US computer scientist work-
force was fueled by two developments. First, there was a truly dramatic increase in the foreign
supply of men and women with college educations in science and engineering fields (Freeman
(2009)). To take one important example, in India, the number of first degrees conferred in science
and engineering rose from 176 thousand in 1990 to 455 thousand in 2000. Second, the Immigration
5It seems likely to us that wages increased as well for complementary jobs to computer scientists, such as marketing
and sales staff at software companies. But we leave such spillovers for later research.
6Here and elsewhere, we define foreigners as who immigrated to the US after the age of 18. We believe that this
definition is a proxy for workers who arrived to the US with non-immigrant visa status.
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Act of 1990 established the H-1B visa program for temporary workers in “specialty occupations.”7
The regulations define a “specialty occupation” as requiring theoretical and practical application
of a body of highly specialized knowledge in a field of human endeavor including, but not limited
to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health,
education, law, accounting, business specialties, theology, and the arts. In addition, applicants are
required to have attained a bachelor’s degree or its equivalent as a minimum.
Firms that wish to hire foreigners on H-1B visas must first file a Labor Condition Applica-
tion (LCA). In LCA’s for H-1B workers, the employer must attest that the firm will pay the non-
immigrant the greater of the actual compensation paid to other employees in the same job or the
prevailing compensation for that occupation, and the firm will provide working conditions for the
non-immigrant that do not cause the working conditions of the other employees to be adversely
affected. At that point, prospective H-1B non-immigrants must demonstrate to the US Citizenship
and Immigration Services Bureau (USCIS) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that
they have the requisite education and work experience for the posted positions. USCIS then may
approve the petition for the H-1B non-immigrant for a period up to three years. The visa may be
extended for an additional three years, thus a foreigner can stay a maximum of six years on an H-
1B visa, though firms can sponsor H-1B visa holders for a permanent resident visa. An important
feature of the H-1B visa is that the visa is for work at the specific firm. As a result, workers are
effectively tied to their sponsoring firm.
Since 1990 there has been a cap in the number of H-1B visas that can be issued. Initially this
cap was set at 65,000 visas per year. In the initial years of the program, the cap was never reached,
By the mid-1990s, however, the allocation tended to fill each year on a first come, first served basis,
resulting in frequent denials or delays on H-1Bs because the annual cap had been reached. After
lobbying by the industry, at the end of the decade, Congress acted to raise the cap first to 115,000
7The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 established the precursor to the H-1B visa, the H-1. The H-1
non-immigrant visa was targeted at aliens of “distinguished merit and ability” who were filling positions that were
temporary. Nonimmigrants on H-1 visas had to maintain a foreign residence. The Immigration Act of 1990 established
the main features of H-1B visa as it is known today, replacing “distinguished merit and ability” with the “specialty
occupation” definition. It also dropped the foreign residence requirement and also added a dual intent provision,
allowing workers to potentially transfer from an H-1B visa to immigrant status.
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for FY1999 and to 195,000 for FY2000-2003. The cap then reverted to 65,000.8 Figure 3.2 shows
the growth in the number of H-1 visas issued over the last three decades, estimates of the stock of
H-1 visas in the economy each year, and the changes in the H-1B visa cap.
Through the decade of the 1990s, H-1B visas became an important source of labor for the
technology sector. The National Survey of College Graduates shows that 55% of foreigners work-
ing in CS fields in 2003 arrived in the US on a temporary working (H-1B) or a student type visa
(F-1, J-1). Furthermore, institutional information indicates a significant increase in the number of
visas awarded to computer related occupations during the 1990s. Numbers from the U.S. General
Accounting Office (1992) report show that “computers, programming, and related occupations”
corresponded only to 11% of the total number of H-1 visas in 1989. However, with concurrent
to the Internet boom, computer scientists became a more significant fraction of individuals that
received these type of working visas: according to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (2000) , the number of H-1B visas awarded to computer-related occupation in 1999 jumped
to close to two-thirds of the visas, and the Department of Commerce (2000) estimated that during
the late 1990s, 28% of programmer jobs went to H-1B visa holders.
While H-1B visas holders represent an important source of computer scientists, they do not
represent all foreigners in the country working as computer scientists. A significant number of
such foreigners are permanent immigrants, some of whom may have come either as children or as
students. Other foreigners enter the US to work as computer scientists in the US on L-1B visas,
which permit companies with offices both in the US and overseas to move skilled employees from
overseas to the US. While we know of no data showing the fraction of computer scientists working
in the US on L-1B visas, substantially fewer L-1(A&B) visas are issued than are H-1Bs.
3.2.3 The Previous Literature on the Impact of Immigrants on the High
Tech Workforce in the US
Critiques of the H-1B program (e.g. Matloff (2003)) argue that firms are using cheap foreign
labor to undercut and replace skilled US workers. Even the fiercest critiques of the program do not
claim that employers are technically evading the law (Kirkegaard (2005)). Rather, these authors
8The 2000 legislation that raised the cap also excluded Universities and non-profit research facilities from it, and a
2004 change added an extra 20,000 visas for foreigners who received a masters degree in the US
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argue that the requirement that firms pay visa holders the prevailing wage is close to meaningless.
They claim that firms can describe positions using minimal qualifications for the job, thereby es-
tablishing a low “prevailing” wage, and then hire overqualified foreigners into the position. These
authors conclude that given the excess supply of highly qualified foreigners willing to take the jobs,
and given the lack of portability of the H-1B visa, workers on an H-1B visa are not in a position to
search for higher wages.
One way to get a handle on the extent to which H-1B visa holders are being under-paid relative
to their US counterparts is to compare foreigners on H-1B visas to those with “green cards,” which
are portable. Available evidence suggests that computer scientists holding green cards are paid
more than observationally equivalent H-1B visa holders. Using difference-in-difference propen-
sity score matching, Mukhopadhyay and Oxborrow (2012) find that green card holders earn 25.4
percent more than observably comparable temporary foreign workers. Additionally, based on an
internet survey, Mithas and Lucas (2010), found that IT professionals with green cards earn roughly
5 percent more than observationally equivalent H-1B visa holders using log earnings regressions.
Comparisons between green card and H-1B holders are far from perfect, because green cards are
not randomly assigned. Many high skilled workers obtain green cards by being sponsored by their
employers after they have been working on an H-1B for a number of years. It seems reasonable to
assume that those being sponsored are those that both want to stay in the US and are also amongst
those the employer wants to hold onto. These kind of considerations lead us to suspect that, con-
ditional on observables, green card holders are positively selected. Given these considerations, it
is somewhat surprising that the observed green card premium is not larger than it is.
While there may be no incontrovertible estimate of the productivity (conditional on earnings)
advantage of foreign high skilled labor, simple economic reasons suggests this advantage must ex-
ist. US employers face both pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs associated with hiring foreigners.
A small GAO survey (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2011) estimated the legal and adminis-
trative costs associated with each H-1B hire to range from 2.3 to 7.5 thousand dollars. It seems
reasonable to assume that employers must expect some cost or productivity advantage when hiring
foreigners. This does not mean that foreign hires are always super stars. The productivity advan-
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tage could be quite small, and could involve effort, not ability. However, without some productivity
advantage, it is hard to see why employers go through the effort and expense to hire foreigners.
H-1B critics are arguing that, for the reasons discussed above, employers find hiring foreign
high skilled labor an attractive alternative and that such hiring either “crowds out” natives from
jobs or put downward pressure on their wages. However, as far as we know, critics of the H-
1B program have not tried to estimate the magnitude of either of these effects. Recent work by
economists have started to fill this void. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) and Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle
(2010) provide original empirical evidence on the link between variation in immigrant flows and
innovation measured by patenting - finding evidence suggesting that the net impact of immigration
is positive rather than simply substituting for native employment. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) also
show that variation in immigrant flows at the local level related to changes in H-1B flows do not
appear to adversely impact native employment and have a small, statistically insignificant effect
on their wages.
A potential issue with Kerr and Lincoln’s analysis is that the observed, reduced-form outcomes
may capture concurrent changes in area specific demand for computer scientists. Kerr and Lincoln
fully understand this endogeneity issue. To circumvent the problem, they construct a variable that
interacts an estimate for the total number of individuals working on H-1B visas in a city with local
area dependencies on H-1Bs. Their hope is that the variation in this variable is driven largely by
changes in the cap on new H-1B visas that occurred over the last 20 years. That said, it is unclear
the extent to which the variation Kerr and Lincoln use is being driven by variation in the visa
cap. Because of the dot com bubble bust in 2000 and 2001, the variation in the H-1B cap is only
loosely related to actual number of H-1Bs issued. In addition, it is hard to imagine that the cap was
exogenous to the demand for IT workers. Finally, if because of local agglomeration effects, the
IT boom was concentrated in areas of the country that were already IT intensive (such as Silicon
Valley), then the measure of local dependency would be endogenous.
In the context of an economic model, it is difficult to generate a situation in which there is
little crowd out unless labor demand is very elastic. While there are models of the labor market
which could rationalize such large elasticities,9 this paper proposes an alternative interpretation
9If computer scientists have large effects on firm productivity, then demand curves for them would be very elastic.
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to Kerr and Lincoln’s results, even when the labor demand is not close to perfectly elastic. If
employers face costs to hire immigrant labor and are bound to pay the going wage, firms might
disproportionately hire immigrants only when the demand for workers is increasing. In this case,
immigrants would not replace incumbent workers or depress wages, but rather have a negative
impact on the growth of wages and employment for natives. Under these circumstances, one might
very well see a positive association between an increase in the utilization of foreign computer
scientists and the increased utilization of their US counterparts, even though the availability of
skilled foreigners is putting downward pressure on the growth in earnings and employment of
native computer scientists.
3.3 A Dynamic Model of Supply and Demand of Computer Sci-
entists
To gauge the impact that the availability of foreign high skilled labor has had on US workers,
we construct a simple model of the labor market for computer scientists. While our model is quite
stylized, we intend to capture the most salient features of the market.
In our model there are three potential sources for computers scientists. First, there are those
who earn computer science bachelor’s degrees from US institutions. These individuals must com-
plete college before they are ready to work. Second, there are US residents working in other oc-
cupations who can switch into computer science, but must pay costs to switch occupations. Third,
there are foreigners who are being recruited on temporary work visas.10 There is also the group
who immigrated with their parents as children, but these individuals are typically either citizens or
green card holders and we assume employers do not distinguish between these individuals and the
US born. We also ignore the fact that some immigrants are coming in on permanent visas. As the
GAO and Department of Commerce reports cited earlier suggest, at least in the 1990s, the majority
of foreigners working as computer scientists within the US who have finished their undergraduate
degrees abroad, arrived on temporary work visas. In addition, the data we will use does not allow
Alternatively, one could imagine that, absent the foreign computer scientists, production would shift overseas either
because of domestic firms outsourcing production or because of Heckscher-Ohlin effects.
10Here we are aggregating foreign students getting degrees in the US with their domestic counterparts. During the
1990s, foreigners represented a small (10%) share of new CS graduates each year (IPEDS completion survey).
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us to distinguish visa types.
In terms of the demand side of the model, we assume that firms observe the technological
progress level and make decisions about whether to hire foreigners or domestic workers. We
assume that foreigners are somewhat more productive than US workers but are paid the same wage
due to institutional restrictions. Alternatively, we could have equally well assumed employers
experience a cost advantage associated with hiring foreigners. Furthermore, firms face increasing
costs for recruiting foreigners, making it non-optimal for firms to only hire foreign workers.
3.3.1 Labor Supply of American Computer Scientists
We model U.S computer scientists as making two types of decisions along their career in order
to maximize the expected present value of their life time utility. At age 20, individuals in college
choose the field of study that influences their initial occupation after graduation, and from age 22 to
65, workers choose between working as a computer scientist or in another occupation. Individuals
have rational, forward looking behavior and make studying and working decisions based on the
information available at each period.
3.3.1.1 Studying decision
We assume that students make their major decisions when they are juniors in college. At age 20,
an individual i draws idiosyncratic taste shocks for studying computer science or another field: ηci
and ηoi ,respectively. This student also has expectations about the prospects of starting a career in
each occupation after graduation (age 22), which have a values V c22 and V
o
22 respectively. With this
information, an individual chooses between pursuing computer sciences or a different choice of
major at the undergraduate level.11
We model the utility of a student as a linear function of the taste shocks and career prospects
in each sector. There is also a taste attractiveness parameter αo for studying a different field from
computer science and individuals discount their future with an annual discount factor β. With these
11Essentially, we are assuming that students decide their major after the end of their second year in school. This
presumes that the relative pool of potential applicants would have sufficient background to potentially major in com-
puter science. A four year time horizon is more standard. We experimented with such a horizon and doing so made
little qualitative difference to our conclusions.
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assumptions, the field of study decision is represented by:
max{β2EtV c22 + ηci , β2EtV o22 + αo + ηoi }
We assume that ηci and η
o
i are independently and identically distributed and for s = {c, o}, can
be defined as ηsi = σ0v
s
i , where σ0 is a scale parameter and v
s
i is distributed as a standard Type I
Extreme Value distribution. This distributional assumption is common to dynamic discrete choice
models (Rust (1987), Kline (2008)) and it is convenient because it allows the decisions of agents
to be smoothed out, a desired property that will be used in the characterization of the equilibrium
of the model.
Given the distributional assumption of idiosyncratic taste shocks, it follows that the probability
of a worker graduating with a computer science degree can be written in logistic form:
pct = [1 + exp(−(β2Et−2[V c22 − V o22]− αo)/σ0)]−1
Note that the important parameter for how studying choices of workers are sensitive to different
career prospects is the standard deviation of taste shocks. Small values of σ0 imply that small
changes in career prospects can produce big variations in the number of students graduating with
a computer science degree.
The next step to characterize the supply of young computer scientists is to map the graduating
probability described above to employment. Defining Mat as the exogenous number of college
graduates with age a in time period t,12 the number of recent graduates with a computer science
degree in year t is represented by Ct = pctM
22
t .
3.3.1.2 Working Decision
The field of study determines if an individual enters the labor market as either a computer scientist
or with a different occupation. However, individuals can choose to switch occupations along their
careers. Specifically, at the beginning of each period, individuals between ages 22 and 65 choose to
12We are implicitly assuming that anyone who majors in computer science would have completed college even had
they not majored in computer science and that computer science majors are infra marginal college finishers. A similar
assumption was made by Ryoo and Rosen (2004) in their work on Engineers.
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work in CS or another type of job in order to maximize the expected present value of their lifetime
utility.
A feature of the model is that switching occupations is costly for the worker. A justification for
this assumption is that workers have occupational-specific human capital that cannot be transferred
(Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b)). We assume the cost to switch occupations is a quadratic
function of a worker’s age. Note that this assumption implies that it becomes increasingly harder
for workers to switch occupations as they get older. Additionally, there is no general human capital
accumulation and wages do not vary with the age of a worker.13
Finally, we assume that workers have linear utility from wages, taste shocks and career prospects.
Furthermore, wages must be totally consumed in that same year and workers cannot save or bor-
row. The Bellman equations of worker i at age a between 22 and 64 at time t if he starts the period
as a computer scientist or other occupation are respectively:
V ct,a = max{wct + βEtV ct+1,a+1 + εcit, wot − c(a) + βEtV ot+1,a+1 + εoit + α1}
V ot,a = max{wct − c(a) + βEtV ct+1,a+1 + εcit, wot + βEtV ot+1,a+1 + εoit + α1}
where c(a) = λ0 + λ1a+ λ2a2, is the monetary cost of switching occupation for an age a worker,
and α1 is the taste attractiveness parameter for not working as a computer scientist. For simplicity,
we assume that the current wage in the other occupation wot is exogenous and perfectly anticipated
by the workers.14 In the model, all workers retire at age 65 and their retirement benefits do not
depend on their career choices. As a consequence, workers at age 65 face the same decision
problem but without consideration for the future.
As in the college-major decision problem, idiosyncratic taste shocks play an important role in
working decisions of an individual. Once more, we will assume that taste shocks are indepen-
dently15 and identically distributed and for s = {c, o} can be defined as εsit = σ1vsit where σ1 is a
13The implications of the model will still hold if there is general human capital accumulation and individuals expect
similar wage growth profiles working as computer scientists or in the alternative occupation.
14As a matter of fact, in the simulations of the paper we will set wot = 1 and measure wages of computer scientists
as an occupational premium.
15In the working decision problem, the independence assumption might be less plausible because taste shocks could
be serially correlated. However, identifying parameters of the model with serially correlated errors is infeasible without
longitudinal data (Kline (2008)).
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scale parameter and vsi is distributed as a standard Type I Extreme Value distribution.
Defining psSt,a as the probability that a worker at age a between 22 and 64 moves from occupation
s to occupation S, it follows from the error distribution assumption that the migration probabilities
can be represented as:
poct,a = [1 + exp(−(wct − wot − c(a)− α1 + βEt[V ct+1,a+1 − V ot+1,a+1])/σ1)]−1
pcot,a = [1 + exp(−(wot − wct − c(a) + α1 + βEt[V ot+1,a+1 − V ct+1,a+1])/σ1)]−1
and the migration probabilities of workers at age 65 are the same without discounting future career
prospects. Note that the switching probabilities depend upon both the current wage differential and
expected future career prospects at each occupation. The standard deviation of the taste shocks, the
sector attractiveness constant and the cost of switching occupations will effect the extent to which
changes in relative career prospects affect the movement of US residents across fields.
A feature of dynamic models with forward looking individuals is that working decisions depend
upon the equilibrium distribution of career prospects. As in the dynamic choice literature with
extreme value errors (Rust (1987) and Kline (2008)), we use the properties of the idiosyncratic
taste shocks distribution to simplify the expressions for the expected values of career prospects.
As a result, the expected value function for an individual at age a between 22 and 64 working as a
computer scientists or in another occupation are respectively:
EtV ct+1,a+1 =
σ1Et[γ + ln{exp((wct+1 + βEt+1V ct+2,a+2)/σ1) + exp((wot+1 − c(a) + α1 + βEt+1V ot+2,a+2)/σ1)}]
EtV ot+1,a+1 =
σ1Et[γ + ln{exp((wot+1 + α1 + βEt+1V ot+2,a+2)/σ1) + exp((wst+1 − c(a) + βEt+1V ct+2,a+2)/σ1)}]
(1)
where gamma γ ∼= 0.577 is the Euler’s constant and the expectations are taken with respect to
future taste shocks. Workers at age 65 face the same expected values but do not discount the
future.
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Now we turn to transforming migration probabilities to employment. The first step is to deter-
mine the CS supply of recent college graduates. After leaving college, individuals can start their
careers in the occupation corresponding to their field of study with no cost. However, we also allow
workers at age 22 to pay the switching costs and get their first job in an occupation different from
their field of study. As a consequence, the number of computer scientists at age 22 is a function of
the number of recent graduates with a computer science degree and the migration probabilities:
L22t = (1− pcot,22)Ct + poct,22[M22t − Ct]
where M22t is the number of recent college graduates, Ct is the number of recent graduates with a
computer science degree, and M22t −Ct is the number of college graduates with any other degree.
In the same way, the supply of computer scientists at age a from 23-65 is a function of past
employment in each occupation and the migration probabilities:
Lat = (1− pcot,a)La−1t−1 + poct,a[Ma−1t−1 − La−1t−1 ]
where Mat is the exogenous total number of workers in the economy at age a in time period t.
Mat − Lat is the number of workers at age a working in the residual sector. For simplicity, we
assume that the number of workers in the economy at age Mat is exogenous and constant over
time.16
The aggregate domestic labor supply of computer scientists is the sum of labor supply at all
ages:
Lt =
∑a=65
a=22 L
a
t (2)
Note that the labor supply of computer scientists depends on past employment, new college grad-
uates with a computer science degree and on wages through the migration probabilities.
3.3.2 Labor Supply of Foreign Computer Scientists
An important characteristic of our model is that firms can recruit foreigners to work as computer
scientists. As it will become clear throughout the section, this possibility has implications on how
16In the simulation of the paper we set Mat to be constant for all ages and
∑a=65
a=22M
a
t = 100. We measure
employment of computer scientists as percentage points of the employed population of interest.
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the market for CS workers responds to technological shocks, such as Internet innovation, in terms
of enrollment decisions, wages and employment.
We model foreign computer scientists as having a perfectly elastic labor supply. The wage
that a computer scientist could obtain in India, for example, is so much lower than it is in the US
that the wage premium creates a large queue of individuals ready to take jobs in the US (Clemens
(2013) provides direct evidence on this point).17 Additionally, we assume that foreigners cannot
switch their occupation once hired to work as computer scientists and they continue to work in the
US until their visa expires.18
A simplified way to model the framework describe above is to define Rt as the number of
foreigners recruited as CS in period t. Next, we assume that all CS foreigners stay in the US for
6 years, that is the maximum length of a H-1B visa contract.19 In this framework, the number of
foreigners currently working as CS in the US is defined as the sum of current and the recruitment
in the past 5 years:
Ft =
∑5
j=0Rt−j (3)
3.3.3 Labor Demand for Computer Scientists
We model the labor demand as resulting from the decisions made by a standard representative firm
in a perfectly competitive framework. In the model, firms observe both the wage and technological
progress levels and choose US and foreign employment in order to maximize their intertemporal
profits. While firms do not assume that their US employees will necessarily stay with them from
one period to the next, given the institutional setting, firms do assume that foreign workers will
continue with the firm until the workers’ visa expires six years after he or she is hired.
We assume there is only one type of firm that hires computer scientists. CS labor is the only
17As it will become clear later, the reason why in our model foreigners do not swamp the U.S. labor markets is
because firms must pay, in addition to prevailing wages, increasing recruitment costs to employ foreigners.
18In fact, during the period we are studying roughly half of those on H-1B visas eventually became permanent
residences. In our online appendix, we present a modification of the model that allows a constant fraction of H-1B
visa holders to become permanent residents. Our results are consistent across modeling specifications.
19The initial duration of the H-1B contract is 3 years, but it is extendable for an additional 3 years. Extensions do
not count toward the H-1B cap, and are generally granted. As it will become clear in the labor demand side, in our
model firms have incentive to keep foreigners for the maximum length of their contract.
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input used in the production function and we ignore the firm’s decision about capital or other types
of labor adjustments.20 We further assume that computer scientists at different ages are perfect
substitutes in the production function. As a consequence, firms do not distinguish workers by age
when making their hiring decision, precluding the kind of issues addressed by Kerr et al. (2013).21
In addition, we assume that foreigners and US workers are close substitutes in the production
function, but foreigners have higher marginal productivity than US workers.
A restriction we impose in the model is that all computer scientists in the market are paid the
same wage independently of their age or citizenship. This assumption is in accordance with the H-
1B visa regulation that requires that wages paid to foreigners must be at least the prevailing wage
rate for the occupational classification in their area of employment. Finally, there are no adjustment
costs for American workers but firms incur extra costs to recruit foreigners.22 This expenditure is
justified by the fees and expenses directly related to the visa application process, and also the extra
cost that a firm typically has for searching for workers overseas.
As it will become clear throughout the section, this framework implies that firms face a trade-
off when making the decision of hiring foreigners. On one hand, foreigners have a higher marginal
productivity than US workers and are paid the same wage. As a consequence, firms are willing
to substitute foreign workers for their US workers. On the other hand, there are extra recruitment
costs to bring foreigners to the US. This restriction implies that firms never completely substitute
foreign for US workers.
3.3.3.1 Firm’s Decision
The forward looking firm makes decisions about the recruitment of US and foreign workers in
order to maximize intertemporal profits, as represented by the Bellman equation:23
20The assumption that labor adjustment decisions are independent of capital is standard in the dynamic labor demand
literature when data on capital stock is not available (Hamermesh (1989)). Including capital in the production function
generally does not qualitatively change the results (Kline (2008)).
21While we suspect is would make sense to allow workers of different ages to be imperfect substitutes in production
for each other, CPS sample sized are too small to support this kind of analysis.
22In our online appendix we set-up and calibrate a model where the quadratic cost term for hiring foreigners also
applies to Americans. Our results are not sensitive to this modeling change.
23For simplicity, we assume that firms and individuals have the same annual discount factor β. For expositional
purposes, we now omit the the superscript c for wages and employment of computer scientists.
110
pit = maxLt,RtAtY (Lt + θFt)− wt(Lt + Ft)− CR(Rt) + βEt[pit+1]
subject to foreign labor supply:
Ft =
∑5
j=0Rt−j
where AtY (.) is the production function, θ is a constant greater than 1 that represents marginal
productivity differences between foreigners and US workers, and CR(.) is the recruitment cost
function of foreigners.
We represent the production function as Cobb-Douglas, such that Y (Lt + θFt) = (Lt + θFt)γ ,
for some γ between zero and one, implying a downward sloping labor demand curve for computer
scientists. This set-up can be made consistent with the Romer (1986) model of knowledge accu-
mulation as a by-product of capital accumulation; or the Arrow (1962) learning-by-doing model,
where we allow increases in employment to lead to increases in productivity. To see this, we can
reformulate the production function to be Yt = [Bt(Lt+ θFt)]δ. If we let the technology parameter
exhibit learning-by-doing, then Bt = ψt(Lt + θFt)α, giving us a production function of the form
Yt = ψ
δ
t (Lt+θFt)
δα. If we define, At = ψδt and γ = αδ, then we recover the simple Cobb-Douglas
production function: At(Lt + θFt)γ. The parameter, γ, should then be thought of as a reduced-
form parameter that captures not just the effective labor share in output, but also the productivity
gains from hiring more effective workers. As long as γ lies between 0 and 1, this parametrization
guarantees a decreasing marginal return to labor and thus an interior solution for the employment
decision of the firm. Furthermore, the parameter γ has a direct mapping to the long-run elasticity
of labor demand with respect to effective labor (Le = L+ θF ):
Le,w =
1
1−γ
Additionally, we assume that recruitment costs of foreigners include both linear and quadratic
components CR(Rt) = c1Rt + c2R2t . The linear term in the foreign recruitment cost repre-
sents expenditures that are required for hiring each foreign worker, such as application fees. The
quadratic term has been widely used in dynamic labor demand literature (Sargent (1978) and
Shapiro (1986)). As will become clear from the first order condition of the firm, convex hiring
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costs prevents firms from completely substituting foreigners for domestic workers, by increasing
marginal recruitment costs of foreigners.24
As in a typical dynamic labor demand problem the solution to the firm’s decision can be char-
acterized by both the first order and envelope conditions with respect to the employment level.
The first order condition of the firm’s maximization problem with respect to US employment is
represented by the following equation:
Atγ(Lt + θFt)
γ−1 = wt (4)
Note that because there is no adjustment costs for US workers, the first order condition with respect
to US employment is the same as in a static maximization problem. It is simply characterized by
firms equalizing the marginal product of US workers to their wage level.
In addition to choosing US worker employment, the firm also decides the number of foreign
workers recruited at each period. The first order condition of the firm’s problem with respect to Rt
is given by:
θAtγ(Lt + θFt)
γ−1 − wt − c1 − 2c2Rt +
∑5
j=1 β
jEt[∂pit+j∂Rt ] = 0
where ∂pit+j
∂Rt
is defined as how profits in t+j are affected by changes in the recruitment in t. Finally,
we use envelope condition to derive the shadow price of past foreign recruitment on current profits,
such that:
∂pit
∂Rt−j
= θAtγ(Lt + θFt)
γ−1 − wt for j = 1, ..., 5
Rearranging the first order and envelope conditions of foreigner recruitment leads us to the useful
alternative representation to the demand for foreign workers:
∑5
j=o β
jEt[θAt+jγ(Lt+j + θFt+j)γ−1 − wt+j] = c1 + 2c2Rt (5)
24Our formulation implies the foreign share of new hires will rise as demand increases. There are alternative models
that would imply something similar. For example, if firms had some local monopsony power, and if foreign labor were
supplied elastically, firms would accommodate demand increases by shifting recruitment toward foreign labor so as to
avoid paying increased wages associated with the increased hiring of US trained labor.
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Equation (5) shows the trade-off faced by firms when hiring foreigners. The left hand side
can be interpreted as the present value of the expected marginal benefit of recruiting a foreigner,
defined as the difference between the marginal productivity of a foreigner and wage level during
the 6 years duration of his contract. Note that firms benefit from hiring foreigners because they
are more productive than US workers by a constant θ but are paid the same wage. The right hand
side represents the marginal cost of recruiting a foreigner. Since the marginal cost of recruiting a
foreigner is increasing with Rt, firms will never completely substitute foreigners for US workers
in the model.
3.3.4 Equilibrium
A dynamic general equilibrium can be characterized by the system of equations that represent those
choice functions and the stochastic process of technological progress At. In particular, equation
(1) characterizes the expectations of workers with respect to future career prospects, equations (2)
and (3) are the dynamic labor supply of American and foreigner computer scientists respectively,
and equations (4) and (5) describe the dynamic labor demand for American and foreign CS.
The last piece to characterize the equilibrium of the model is to define a stochastic process of
technological progress. Note that At is the only source of exogenous variation to the system. We
choose to specify At as a close to random walk process,25 such that:
At = 0.999At−1 + 0.001A¯+ ξt (6)
where A¯ is the steady state level of progress, and ξt is the i.i.d. random idiosyncratic productivity
25We model the technology progress as a close to random walk since we will interpret the Internet boom as a series
of very persistent technological shocks that hit the information technology sector during the late 1990s. We also
interpret the 2000 to 2004 to be a dot com bust. We found little evidence that workers, students or employers expected
the increase in the demand for computer scientists during the 1990s to be temporary (and subject to a post-Y2K bug
slump). First, the BLS projected a steady increase in CS employment after the year 2000, and claimed that it expected
the top two fastest growing occupations to be computer scientists, and computer engineers respectively. Furthermore,
there is a substantial increase in CS degrees started during the dot-com boom, indicating that students perceived the
demand for computer scientists to be increasing permanently during the period. We therefore believe that a more
realistic assumption is that agents perceived the increase in demand during the late 1990s to be permanent - and that
the World Wide Web generated opportunities for new businesses that demanded computer scientists. However, at some
period in the beginning of the year 2000, presumably for a variety of reasons, the boom turned around and NASDAQ
crashed.
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shock with mean zero that is assumed to be independent of other variables of the model.26
The equilibrium of the model can be expressed by a mapping from the state variables: s =
{Ct,L22t−1, ..., L64t−1, Rt−1, ..., Rt−5, At−1} and exogenous productivity shock ξt to the values of Lt,
wt, Rt, and Vt, the vector of career prospects at different occupations for different ages, that satis-
fies the system of equations (1) to (6). We solve the system by numerically simulating the model in
Dynare (a widely used software) via perturbation methods (Juillard (1996)). The policy functions
are calculated using a second order polynomial approximation to the decision rules implied by the
equations of the model Collard and Juillard (2001a,b).
3.4 Calibration and Simulation
3.4.1 Identification and Calibration Method
There are twelve parameters in the model {σ0, α0, σ1, α1, λ0, λ1, λ2, β, γ, θ, cR1, cR2}. We set the
foreign worker productivity27 parameter θ = 1.12 based on estimations from the 2003 National
Survey of College Graduates data.28 This value of the wage premium earned by foreign green
card holders is broadly consistent with other estimates in the literature (Mithas and Lucas (2010),
Mukhopadhyay and Oxborrow (2012)). Furthermore, we set the annual discount rate of workers
and firms β = 0.9. Our results are not sensitive to plausible variations of this parameter.
In our modeling we are treating the wage, employment and enrollment shifts as a response to
an exogenous shift in the demand for computer scientists due to the technological developments
that occurred during the period of analysis. We use this demand shift to identify the enrollment
and labor supply response of natives, and the parameters affecting the hiring decision of foreigners:
{σ0, α0, λ0, λ1, λ2, σ1, α1, cR1, cR2}. At the same time, demand shifts will not identify the slope of
26Note that both workers and firms are risk neutral in our model. For this reason, the certainty equivalence property
holds and the solution of the model does not depend on higher moments of the idiosyncratic productivity shock.
27In an Online Appendix we re-do all our results for different values of this parameter, and find that our results are
not sensitive to the choice of this parameter.
28Specifically, we estimate the wage premium for foreign born computer scientists who are naturalized or per-
manent residents, compared to US born CS workers. This estimation comes from a logarithmic of annual earnings
regression controlling for gender and a cubic age polynomial. We interpret this wage premium as the average marginal
productivity difference between foreign and US computer scientists.
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the labor demand curve. As a result, we present the results of the paper using different assumptions
about the values of γ.
To calibrate {σ0, α0, λ0, λ1, λ2, σ1, α1, cR1, cR2}, we use observations of US and foreign em-
ployment, wages, and enrollment29 between 1994 and 2004. We define other STEM occupations
as the career alternative to CS jobs. The data we are using on employment and earnings is derived
from the March Current Population Survey. This survey contains no indication as to the visa status
of the foreign born. To approximate the population of interest, we identify the foreign born who
immigrated to the US after they turned 18 as our foreign workers. We also normalize employment
variables to use units of American STEM workers, and wages to use units of wages30 of other
STEM jobs, and thus define our key data series as:31
1. Lt =
US computer scientists
US workers with STEM occupations
2. Ft =
Foreign computer scientists
US workers with STEM occupations
3. wt =
Median weekly wages for computer scientists
Median weekly wages for other STEM jobs
4. pct+2 =
US computer science Bachelor’s degrees awarded (lagged 2 years)
US STEM Bachelor’s degrees awarded (lagged 2 years)
5. sa1,a2t =
US computer scientists with age between a1and a2
US computer scientists
For a1and a2 defined as the age ranges {22 to 34; 35 to 44; 45 to 65}.
Conditional on γ and θ and observations of {wt, Lt, Ft}we are able to recover values ofAt implied
by our model during the period of 1994 to 2004:
At =
wt
γ(Lt+θFt)γ−1
29Uses data from 1996 to 2006, representing enrollment decisions from 1994 to 2004. See the Online Appendix for
more details.
30We exclude imputed values of wages, and multiply top-coded values by a factor of 1.4. Bollinger and Hirsch
(2007) show that not excluding imputations can lead to biased results. Whereas the top-coding adjustment is standard
in the literature (Lemieux (2006)). See the Online Appendix for more details.
31See the data appendix online for more information on occupational classifications. We smooth the raw data as
follows: Xt,smooth = 13 (Xt−1,raw + Xt,raw + Xt+1,raw), except for the American and foreigner employment data
in 1994, which citizenship information is unavailable prior to 1994 for which we use: X1994,smooth = 23Xt,raw +
1
3Xt+1,raw).
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We assume that the economy is in steady state in 1994, such that A¯ = A1994, and that it is hit
by the series of shocks. In terms of expectations, we assume that both firms and individuals are
surprised by changes in At.32 Note that following equation (6), firms and workers have essentially
static expectations about future technology progress, such that Et[At+j] ∼= At for any j.
The remaining parameters {σ0, α0, λ0, λ1, λ2, σ1, α1, cR1, cR2} are calibrated such that the model
matches the observations of Lt, Ft, wt, in two periods of time: 1994 and 2004, and the changes
in the age structure sa1,a2t in 2004.33 We use a Nelder-Mead simplex method to find parameter
values which yield solutions to the model under these data restrictions.34 The intuition for the
identification of the parameters comes straight from the data. For the given series of exogenous
technological shocks and wages, variations of enrollment between 1994 and 2004 identify the pa-
rameters σ0 and α0, changes in native employment identify the parameters σ1 and α1, variations in
foreign employment identify the recruitment cost parameters cR1 and cR2, and changes in the age
structure of computer scientists identify the quadratic costs of switching occupations: parameters
λ0, λ1, and λ2.
3.4.2 Calibration results
We use the procedure described above to calibrate the model using three different values of γ:
{0.25, 0.5, 0.75}.35 We present the calibrated parameters for these different values of γ in Table
32We also considered the alternative assumption that all agents fully or partially anticipated the future path of
technological process. This assumption yields time paths for wages and employment that are quite similar to the
ones we observe under our static expectations assumption. In contrast, with this alternative assumption, enrollment
jumps almost immediately, which is inconsistent with the time path of enrollment we observe. At the same time,
our counterfactual simulations presented later with the alternative anticipation assumption are similar to the ones we
present with static expectations. Presumably a model that allowed expectations to evolve would be more realistic.
However, given the robustness of our central results to the static versus foresight assumption, we did not explore such
an alternative.
33The decision to match changes in the age structure of CS rather then levels is to assure that our calibrated model
reflects movements that occurred in the market for CS during the period rather than the age structure of the entire
population.
34Note that we have a perfectly identified system: we find the values of 9 independent parameters and 2 implied
values of At such that the model matches 11 data observations: Lt, Ft, wt and pct−2 in two years and the observation
of changes in s22,34t , s
35,44
t ,and s
45,65
t in 2004.
35γ in the 0.25 to 0.75 range imply labor demand elasticities between -1.33 and -4.0. Ryoo and Rosen (2004a),
estimate demand elasticities for engineers that lie between -1.2 and -2.2, while Borjas (2009), studying the effect
the immigration of foreign born PhD scientists on the wages of competing workers, estimates demand elasticities of
approximately -3.0. This do suggest that we have varied γ through a sensible range.
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3.2 and a comparison of the data with the model’s output in Figures 3.3 - 3.4. We consider the
demand elasticities derived from our γ’s to span a reasonable range of plausible values of this
parameter, which as we describe in Section 3.4.4, is challenging to identify.
The calibrated model allows us to calculate several additional economically meaningful statis-
tics, which we also include in the bottom segment of Table 3.2. We calculate the long-run oc-
cupation and enrollment elasticities with respect to wages, by replacing the demand side of the
model with an exogenous wage, which we set to be permanently 1% higher than its 1994 value,
and in each case, we allow the supply side to come to a new equilibrium based on the calibrated
parameters.We similarly calculate the short-run occupation and enrollment elasticities, but instead
of allowing the supply side to come to a new steady-state, we calculate the elasticities based off of
changes in occupation and enrollment after 1 year.
In the bottom section of Table 3.2, we show how each of these long-run elasticities varies with
γ. The long-run occupational labor supply elasticity for Americans is around 5.4. The enrollment
in CS is even more elastic, with a long-run elasticity that lies around 11.6.36 This result reflects
the large enrollment response we witness in the data. The short-run occupation elasticity is much
lower than the corresponding long-run elasticity. We expect this result, due to the supply frictions
and lags in our model. In contrast, the short-run and long-run enrollment elasticities are almost
exactly the same. Pre-enrollment students respond immediately to a wage shock. A fuller model
which includes capacity constraints on the supply side of the higher education market, would work
to slow such adjustments. Finally, the average cost of recruiting a foreign worker is about 0.53
times the average annual earnings of a non-CS STEM job.
In Figures 3.3-3.4, we report both the path predicted by our calibrated model (Full model) and
the path observed in the data (Smooth data) during 1994-2009. Note that by the construction of our
calibration procedure, the full model fits the data perfectly in 1994 and 2004. We use the transition
period between 1995 to 2003 to evaluate how well the model fits the data, and the years 2005-2009
for out of sample prediction. These years include observed changes to relevant immigration laws,
and potentially unobserved structural changes which would map to changes in our parameters, so
36Ryoo and Rosen estimate substantially smaller enrollment elasticities of between 2.5 and 4.5, but are modeling
the decision to enroll in a broader field than we are.
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our model has trouble fitting the data in this period for some series. Figure 3.3 shows that for
different γ’s, the model is a fairly close fit for CS wages and American employment during the
evaluation period, although CS wages in the model grow faster at first and American employment
in CS grows more slowly in the model than the data. The fit of these two series is still relatively
good in the out of sample prediction period, with wages slightly higher and American employment
slightly lower in the model compared to the data.
Figure 3.4 shows that the enrollment output of the model is particularly sensitive to the choice
of γ, where lower values somewhat under-predict the enrollment boom surrounding 2001. At odds
with the predictions of our model, enrollment does not increase starting in 2006. Given the rising
wages of computer scientists at the time, this pattern seems a bit surprising and we confess to
not having a good understanding as to why enrollments do not seem to be responding to market
signals. The figure also shows that foreign employment grows more slowly at first in the model
than the data. In the out of sample period, foreign employment shrinks in the model instead of
growing slightly, as in the data. This could be because our model assumes that after a 6-year
period, foreigners return to their home country. In the Online Appendix, we calibrate a model that
allows a certain fraction of H-1B workers to become permanent residents. This extension of the
model does a better job of fitting the share of foreign employment in the last few years (and overall
does a good job of fitting the different calibrated series).
3.4.3 Simulation of Fixed Foreign Worker Population Counterfactual
We use our calibrated model to simulate a counterfactual Internet boom from 1994-2004, as if firms
had restrictions on the number of foreigners that they can hire. The exercise consists of hitting the
calibrated model with the same technological shocks we derived before but imposing that firms
cannot increase Ft above its 1994 level. The results of this simulation are also presented in Figures
3.3-3.4 (Restricted Model). There we can compare the counterfactual for different values of γ with
the smoothed data.
Overall, our calibrated model implies an increase in the demand for domestic workers when
firms cannot increase foreign employment above its 1994 level. As a result, we observe higher
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wages, US employment and computer science enrollment in the counterfactual economy. We
simulate significant differences in the labor market for computer scientists during the Internet
boom if firms had restrictions on the number of foreigners they could hire. While the data shows
that the relative wages for CS workers increased by 3.2% between 1994 and 2004, in the simulated
economy wages would have increased between 5.9% to 6.9% (decreasing with γ) during the same
period. In terms of employment, we observe an increase of 41% of total CS employment during
the Internet boom, while in the economy where we restrict foreign workers we find an increase
of only 29.1% to 36.1% (decreasing with γ) during the same period. This change in employment
results from the more inelastic labor supply curve that firms face when extra foreigners are not
available.
In Table 3.3 we compare the 2004 levels of the variables of interest between the data and the
simulated economy where firms could not increase foreign employment above its 1994 levels. We
find that in 2004, CS workers wages would be 2.8% to 3.8% higher if firms had restrictions in the
number of foreigners they could hire. Furthermore,the number of Americans working in the CS
sector would be 7.0% to 13.6% higher in 2004, but the total employment level would be lower by
3.8% to 9.0%. Finally we find a significant difference in the number of students enrolling in com-
puter science in the simulated counterfactual economy. Relative to other STEM fields, enrollment
in CS would be 19.9% - 25.5% higher in 2004 if firms could not increase foreign employment dur-
ing the Internet boom. These numbers reflect the fact that, according to our calibrations, students’
major choices are very sensitive to changes in wages.
To sum up, even when assuming a very elastic labor demand curve (high γ values) we find
significant effects of foreign recruitment on wages and employment of domestic CS workers during
the Internet boom. Additionally, firms would not replace all foreigners with domestic workers
during this period if they were restricted to keeping the same foreign employment level of 1994,
implying that industry output would be reduced.
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3.4.4 Identification of Labor Demand
As shown previously, the labor market outcomes of the counterfactual simulations holding Ft
fixed can vary with values of γ. In particular, we observe that when using a more elastic labor
demand (higher γ), our simulated counterfactual economy (where we restrict foreigner workers)
from section 4.3 has smaller increases in wages and US employment. The natural question is
which, if any, of the 3 different γ′s yields results that are closest to what we would observe if firms
had not been able to recruit foreigners during the Internet boom?
In a closed, constant returns to scale economy, the elasticity of demand for computer scientists
would depend on both the substitutability between consumption of goods produced in sectors of
the economy intensive in computer scientists and other goods, and on the substitutability between
production of computers scientists and other factors of production. Given the fact that the share
of computer scientists working in any one sector is not large,37 the demand elasticity will be de-
termined largely by the elasticity of substitution between computer scientists and other factors of
production. In the relatively small window of time we are talking about, it is hard to believe these
elasticities are that large.
There are two factors that mitigate this basic conclusion. First, to the extent that computer
scientists contribute to innovation in the sectors of the economy intensive in computer scientist
labor, the derived elasticity of demand for computer scientists in those sectors is likely to be higher
than it would otherwise have been. In addition, the potential for off-shoring would drive up the
derived elasticity of demand for computer scientists. However, even if, for these reasons, the
derived demand for computer sciences in computer manufacturing and computer services was
quite high, a small enough share of computer scientists work in these industries, that it is hard to
believe either agglomeration effects or off-shoring can drive up the derived demand elasticity for
computer scientists that much. Additionally, if it would have been easy for employers to outsource,
CEOs like Microsoft’s Bill Gates would not have been lobbying to increase the H-1B visa cap. It
is hard to reconcile the fact that the computer industry is lobbying so hard for easier access to
foreigners, if it did not matter where their workforce was located.
37According to the Census, roughly 30% of computer scientists worked in either the computer manufacturing or the
computer services three-digit industries during 1990 and 2000.
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Traditionally, exogenous shifts in supply are used to identify demand curves. In our case,
while there is a plausibly exogenous component to the increased representation of the foreign born
amongst the US Science and Engineering workforce, our visa system ensures that there is a large
endogenous component. In theory, it might be possible to get some leverage on identifying the
labor demand curve for CS workers by comparing the results of the counterfactual simulation for
the different γ′s to the observations of what happened in the Information Technology (IT) sector in
the the mid 1970s. Specifically, as described in Bound et al. (2013), during this earlier period, the
IT sector experienced a significant transformation due to the introduction of the microprocessor,
which generated an increase in the demand for IT workers. However, firms had substantially less
access to foreign labor during that earlier boom than they did during the 1990s. This happened
because there was a sharp increase in the supply of college graduates from overseas in the past
decades, but also due to the change in the US visa system in the early 1990s that facilitated a
greater inflow of high skilled foreigners via employer-sponsored visas.
Our strategy would be to use our calibrated model to simulate what would happen if firms had
less access to foreign high-skilled labor in the 1990s boom and compare these simulations to the
earlier boom. Comparisons between simulation results with different values of γ and what actually
happened earlier would help narrow plausible values for γ. Intuitively, if demand is relatively
elastic, the loss of access to foreigners would have relatively little impact on wages, but a large
impact on total CS employment. Whereas a less elastic demand curve would have a large effect on
wages and less of an effect on total CS employment. This kind of exercise is valid only under the
strong assumptions that our economic model accurately reflects that labor market for IT workers,
and that the demand and supply elasticities were the same during the two periods and that the two
shocks generated shifts in the labor demand of roughly the same magnitude. However heroic such
assumptions might be, the strategy fails for a simpler reason. The strategy requires comparing
wage and employment changes for a small segment of the workforce across periods. Our estimates
were simply not reliable enough for such exercises to be meaningful.
Given the data limitations and other complications discussed in this section, we cannot provide
an estimate for the value of γ, but our discussion suggests that the elasticity of demand for computer
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scientists should not be too large and that the values presented in this paper cover a plausible range.
3.5 Discussion
The model we have developed in this paper suggests an intermediate position as the most reason-
able one in the debate over the effects of high-skilled immigration, on US workers. Focusing on
the tech boom of the 1990s, we develop a model that allows us to answer the counterfactual ques-
tion: what would have happened to overall employment, to the employment of US residents, and
to wages in the IT sector had the immigration of computer scientists been restricted to its level as
of the early 1990s before the tech boom? Our results suggest a middle ground between the two
sides of this debate.
First, our estimates suggest that even without foreign trained computer scientists, the supply of
computer scientists to the US market is quite elastic, especially in the medium run, as the students
induced to study computer science by the increased opportunities in the field begin to enter the
market. For elasticities of demand that lie between -1.3 and -4.0, we show that had firms not been
able to hire immigrants through the late 1990s, the wages of US trained computer scientists would
have been 2.8% to 3.8% higher than they were, and there would have been 7% to 13.6% more
Americans working as computer scientists.
At the same time our estimates suggest that were it not for the immigrant computer scientists
that firms were able to hire, the growth in the number of computer scientists in the economy would
have been significantly slowed. Our estimates suggest that total employment in the CS sector
would have been 3.8-9% lower if firms were not able to hire additional immigrants during the late
1990s, thus implying that the fact that firms could hire immigrants during the 1990s increased
output and lowered both input and output prices in the computer scientist intensive sectors of the
economy. How much these developments benefited stock holders and consumers depends on the
nature of the output market, which we have not tried to model. The increased employment of com-
puter scientists would also have increased the demand for complementary production inputs, such
as software marketing and sales workers. Furthermore, the availability of foreign CS workers made
the CS labor supply curve more elastic, further enhancing this demand increase for complements.
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Under the assumption that the tech boom of the 1990s exogenously increased the demand for
computer scientists, we have been able to reliably estimate supply curves. Estimating the slope
of the labor demand curve was substantially more difficult. In other contexts, labor economists
have been willing to assume some degree of exogeneity to immigrant supplies. In the current
framework, the institutional context implies that immigrant CS labor is completely endogenous to
labor demand.
While we cannot reliably estimate the slope of the demand curve for computer scientists, we
believe that we can reject any notion that the demand curve for computer scientists is close to per-
fectly elastic. Perfectly elastic demand curves are inconsistent with the rising wages for computer
scientists that we observe during the 1990s. As long as the demand curve for computer scientists
is downward sloping, the increased access employers had to foreign-trained, skilled immigrants
during the 1990s works to lower both the wages and employment opportunities for US trained
computer scientists.
Our paper should be viewed as a first-step towards modeling the US labor market for computer-
scientists. In the model we incorporate features that were ignored in earlier models developed by
Freeman (1976) and Ryoo and Rosen (2004a). Specifically we model both the possibility that
individuals might switch occupations, and the possibility that firms might hire immigrants from
abroad. In the context of computer scientists both are clearly important. We focused on the market
for computer scientists. In the context of other scientific fields where a masters or PhD are essential,
it would also be important to model foreign participation in US graduate programs as well. Such
an effort would need to model both the demand for and supply of higher education. While we
believe that such an effort would be of considerable value, we leave it for future research.
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Table 3.1: Fraction of Computer Scientists and Immigrants in the US Workforce by Occupation
Year 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Computer Scientists:
as a fraction of workers with a BA/MA 1.68% 1.83% 3.30% 5.66% 5.28%
as a fraction of STEM college graduates 16.86% 23.60% 35.99% 53.31% 54.90%
Immigrants:
as a fraction of Bachelor’s/Master’s 2.10% 5.43% 6.86% 8.41% 12.77%
as a fraction of Computer Scientists 2.37% 7.09% 11.06% 18.59% 27.82%
as a fraction of Other STEM workers 3.63% 9.72% 10.71% 12.69% 18.21%
Note: Sample restricted to employed workers with a Bachelors or a Masters degree. Definition of Computer Scientists
and STEM workers determined by occupational coding (for details see Data Appendix online). Immigrant is defined
as one born abroad, and migrated to the US after the age of 18.
Source: US Census (years 1970 to 2000); ACS (2010)
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Table 3.2: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description γ
0.25 0.50 0.75
Calibrated Parameters Calibrated Value
α0 Mean taste for not studying CS 0.0940 0.0943 0.0836
σ0 Std. dev. of study area taste shocks 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
α1 Mean taste for not working in CS 0.3715 0.3486 0.3673
σ1 Std. dev. of occupation taste shocks 0.1385 0.1364 0.1439
cR1 Foreign linear recruitment cost 0.5247 0.5228 0.5221
cR2 Foreign quadratic recruitment cost 0.0102 0.0109 0.0124
λ0 Sector switching constant cost 0.1159 0.1164 0.1031
λ1 Sector switching linear cost 0.0138 0.0119 0.0151
λ2 Sector switching quadratic cost 0.0006 0.0004 0.0003
Economic Results
Ld,w Long run effective labor demand elasticity 1.33 2.00 4.00
Ls,w Long run US occupational labor supply elasticity 5.4612 5.5743 5.3404
p,w Long run US CS enrollment elasticity 11.6954 11.2624 11.7071
sLs,w Short run US occupational labor supply elasticity 0.5591 0.6745 0.6642
sp,w Short run US CS enrollment elasticity 10.2834 11.3758 11.3386
ACF Average cost of recruiting foreign worker 0.5312 0.5299 0.53
Note: The average cost of recruiting a foreign worker is measured in units of average annual US non-CS STEM worker
wages. The parameter γ determines the labor demand elasticity to wages.
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Table 3.3: Summary of Results from Counterfactual Simulation
% Differences between Simulated Economy
Holding F Constant and Actual Outcomes in 2004
Variable γ
0.25 0.5 0.75
CS Wages 3.8% 3.2% 2.8%
CS US Native Employment 13.6% 12.5% 7.0%
CS Enrollment 25.5% 20.2% 19.9%
Total Employment -3.8% -4.6% -9.0%
Note: The counterfactual simulates an economy from 1994-2009 in which the level of foreign CS workers is not
allowed to increase from its 1994 value. The parameter γ determines the labor demand elasticity to wages. See section
4 for details.
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Figure 3.1: Major Trends (1990 to 2012)
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(c) Relative Earnings of Computer Scien-
tists








	
	
	

























	
	
	

	
	


	
	


	
	



	
	


	
	


	
	


	
	


	
	


	
	


	

	

	



	



   ! "#
(d) Foreign Born and Immigrated at Age
18 or Older Fraction of Employed Popula-
tion by Occupation
Note: Sample restricted to employed workers with a Bachelors or a Masters degree. Definition of Computer Scientists
and STEM workers determined by occupational coding (for details see Data Appendix online). STEM majors are
defined as engineering, computer and math sciences and natural science. Earning are median weekly earnings. Imputed
values excluded, and values are lagged by one year due to retrospective nature of the survey. Immigrant defined as one
born abroad, and migrated to the US after the age of 18. Immigration status is not available in the CPS before 1994.
Sources: March CPS (for employment, earnings, and immigrants); IPEDS Completions Survey (for degrees)
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Figure 3.2: H-1 and H-1B Visa Population
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Note: Population stock is constructed using estimations of inflow (visas granted) and outflow (deaths, permanent
residency, or emigration) of H-1 workers. In later years, the number of visas granted could exceed the visa cap due to
exemptions for foreigners who work at universities and non-profit research facilities.
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Figure 3.3: Model and Counterfactual (1/2)
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Note: The full model is the simulation of the economy using the calibrated parameters. The restricted model simulates the same calibrated model, but
restricting firms to keep their foreign temporary worker CS employment to its 1994 value. Wages are relative to other STEM occupations. Employment and
enrollment are shares of STEM workers and undergrad STEM enrollment, respectively, and are multiplied by 100. The parameter gamma determines the
labor demand elasticity to wages. See Section 4 for details.
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Figure 3.4: Model and Counterfactual (2/2)
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Note: The full model is the simulation of the economy using the calibrated parameters. The restricted model simulates the same calibrated model, but
restricting firms to keep their foreign temporary worker CS employment to its 1994 value. Wages are relative to other STEM occupations. Employment and
enrollment are shares of STEM workers and undergrad STEM enrollment, respectively, and are multiplied by 100. The parameter gamma determines the
labor demand elasticity to wages. See Section 4 for details.
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